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INTRODUCTION
In Left Legalism/Left Critique, Wendy Brown and
Janet Halley gather essays that present "a yearning for
justice that exceeds the imagination of liberal legalism, a
critical and self-critical intellectual orientation, and a
certain courage to open the door of political and legal
thought as if the wolves were not there. '3  Left
Legalism/Left Critique shines new light on the problem of
how to invigorate progressive legal theory in the U.S. at the
start of 21st century. The book directly confronts what
many have noted more casually: left-leaning intellectual
analysis has lost ground in politics and law.4 In the
aftermath of the 2004 Presidential election, opponents of
right-wing politics continue to lament the lack of visionary
ideas capable of animating and illuminating centrist,
liberal, or left law reform projects.
5
3. WENDY BROWN & JANET HALLEY, Introduction to LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT
CRITIQUE 36 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
4. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 501-02 (1995)
(explaining that the problems of the critical legal studies movement raised the
question of "whether, in the United States, radical leftist jurisprudential
initiatives could ever be genuinely sustained"); William H. Simon, Fear and
Loathing of Politics in the Legal Academy, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 175 (2001)
(describing and criticizing the persistent and pervasive recent resistance to left
legal theory and politics in legal scholarship).
5. See, e.g., E. J. DIONNE, JR., STAND UP FIGHT BACK: REPUBLICAN TOUGHS,
DEMOCRATIC WIMPS, AND THE POLITICS OF REVENGE (2004) (arguing that
Democrats have been hurt by their failure to articulate clear progressive ideas);
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005) (comparing the passionate, compelling
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In contrast, since the late 1970s, right-wing politics has
been highly successful in rethinking the ideas that
grounded the 20th century U.S. regulatory and welfare
state.6 An explosion of visionary legal theory challenging a
century of non-conservative law reforms has helped drive
the right-wing's political success. 7
Though the left-leaning critical legal studies ("CLS")
movement offered a dramatic challenge to mainstream law
in the 1970s and early 1980s, the standard view holds that
CLS quickly lost its influence and visibility-which had
rarely reached far beyond the margins of a few elite law
schools.8 Later-formed branches of critical legal theory have
survived and even thrived by focusing on particular
problems of race, gender, and sexual identity.9 However, it
conservative vision supporting tax cuts for the very rich with the tepid, unclear
defense of the estate tax by liberals); Matt Bai, The Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2005, (Magazine), at 38 (discussing recent struggles among Democratic
political leaders to find academic experts who can help formulate a more
successful liberal message).
6. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE RIGHT NATION:
CONSERVATIVE POWER IN AMERICA (2004) (discussing why American politics
veered sharply to the right in the late 20th century).
7. See infra Part I.C.; see also HERMAN SCHWARTZ, RIGHT WING JUSTICE: THE
CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO TAKE OVER THE COURTS (2004) (showing how
conservative activists drew on legal scholars to help fuel a dramatic change in
the politics of the judiciary).
8. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 219 (2004) (discussing the decline
of critical legal studies); Richard A. Epstein, Let "The Fundamental Things
Apply" Necessary and Contingent Truths in Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1288, 1294 (2002) (mentioning that Critical Legal Studies achieved
prominence in the 1970s and 1980s for its "socialist concern[s]" but that it "has,
as best one can tell, withered away in the past decade."); Simon, supra note 4,
at 178-79 (explaining that the only significant recent left legal theory, critical
legal studies, is extinct, had little lasting impact within legal scholarship, and
none outside of it).
9. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes et al., Battles Waged, Won, and Lost: Critical
Race Theory at the Turn of the Millennium, Introduction to CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 4-5 (Francisco Valdes, Jerome
McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002) (discussing the persistent
strength of critical race theory despite the challenges from the current time of
racial backlash and retrenchment); Edward L. Rubin, Jews, Truth, and Critical
Race Theory, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 525, 536-37 (1999) (distinguishing critical legal
studies' failure from the relative success of critical race theory, feminist
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seems that these often fragmented offshoots have not
succeeded in building and disseminating a jurisprudence
that comprehensively challenges the foundations of centrist
or right law and policy. 10
While many note the fading of left legal theory with
resignation, relief, or even relish, Left Legalism/Left
Critique aims to firmly and passionately revive and
promote the project of left legal intellectualism. How should
legal activists and scholars whose political commitments
remain left of a rightward-moving center resist their slide
to the margins? Discussions of that question tend to find
four problems with contemporary left legal theory: too much
theory, too much politics, too much law, or too much
identity (and often all of the above).
This book stands out in its strong argument for more,
not less, foundation-challenging theory as a key to renewing
progressive visions of justice. Reviving and updating the
method of critical legal scholarship, the book concentrates
on uncovering the contradictions, constraints, and
compromises embedded in the liberal ideals of liberty and
equality.1
But in the context of early 21st century America,
criticism of "liberal" ideals has become so loud, pervasive,
jurisprudence, and gay legal studies by reasoning that race, sex, and gender are
more politically salient than class conflict in the contemporary United States).
10. See Karen Engle et al., Roundtable Discussion: Subversive Legal
Moments?, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 211 (2003) (comments of Nathaniel
Berman, explaining that critical theories of feminism, race, sexuality, and other
statuses have produced a proliferation of perpetually competing "identity-based
interpretive optics" that leave readers of the law "each criticizing the other for
the pernicious selectivity of their interpretive optic."); see also Athena Mutua,
The Rise, Development, and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and
Related Scholarship, 84 DENY. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2006) (analyzing the
development of critical race theory into several branches, but arguing that this
diversified focus has the potential to build a stronger left critique). In addition,
many versions of feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory, but certainly
not all, reject critical theory and even embrace liberalism. See DUXBURY, supra
note 4, at 504-09 (exploring how critical race and feminist theory may not be
carrying out CLS, but instead may be resisting and rejecting its challenges to
liberal legalism).
11. For an earlier discussion of this critical method in comparison to legal
liberalism, see generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
(1987).
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and banal that some progressives might wonder why we
need the left or intellectuals to add to the din. 12 By joining
and sharpening the attacks on liberal legalism by the right-
wing "wolves," the book may leave some readers worried (or
hopeful) that it ultimately will do more to advance right-
wing anti-liberal legalism and less to advance progressive
alternatives to liberal law reforms. 13 If so, the book might
reinforce the tendency to blame unrestrained theory for the
left's failures14-the very tendency the book wants to refute.
Instead, this review essay argues that the shortcomings
of the book support its main argument. Left Legalism/Left
Critique risks enhancing the rise of the right not because of
too much bold critique, but because of not quite enough.15 In
particular, the book does not have enough bold left theory
about what counts as theory versus praxis, law versus
policy, and identity politics versus distributional politics.
The book tends to undercut the promise of left critique by
suggesting that the move toward left theory requires a
move away from a focus on politics, law, and identity. By
12. For an example of scholarship discussing the downfall of "liberal" ideas,
see STEVEN F. HAYWARD, THE AGE OF REAGAN: THE FALL OF THE OLD LIBERAL
ORDER, 1964-1980 (2001). For an example of popular media discussion of the
failures of liberal politics, see JOHN PODHORETZ, BUSH COUNTRY: How DUBYA
BECAME A GREAT PRESIDENT WHILE DRIVING LIBERALS INSANE (2004).
13. Brown and Halley explain that left critique challenges the liberal
political, and legal order without necessarily distinguishing between "liberal[ ]"
and "conservative[ I" branches of that ideology. Brown & Halley, Introduction,
in LEFT LEGALISMILEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 5. In contemporary politics, in
contrast, criticism of "liberal" ideas is generally directed at a particular political
position within liberalism. I will follow Brown and Halley's convention of using
quotations to refer to this common use of the term "liberal" in opposition to
"conservative" politics, distinct from the more general and technical term that
refers to the liberal political order. Id. Both left and right politics have strands
that move outside this "liberal" versus "conservative" polarization within
liberalism; my point here is to ask how left efforts to go beyond "liberal" politics
and the general frame of liberalism can avoid contributing to right-wing efforts
to also move out of liberalism toward a fascist political order.
14. See infra pp. 1203-08 (discussion of view that too much theory caused
the demise of left legal scholarship).
15. Peter Goodrich made a similar critique of the earlier CLS movement,
arguing that it failed to take seriously either philosophical radicalism or
political radicalism. Peter Goodrich, Sleeping with the Enemy: An Essay on the
Politics of Critical Legal Studies in America, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 389 (1993).
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positioning rigorous, foundation- shaking reason against
practical activism, law reform, and identity-based politics,
the book uncritically reinforces the liberal conceptual
framework that constrains left theory and politics-and
that strengthens right-wing power.
The fact that the left generally has been less successful
than the right in promulgating politically viable
alternatives to "liberal" law in recent years is not primarily
a problem of too much or too little impractical left theory.
Rather, the left has failed because it has not matched the
right in mobilizing politics, law, and identity to change the
dominant theoretical framework-a framework that in turn
maintains and constrains the mainstream debate about
politics, law, and identity so that more progressive
possibilities remain unimaginable.
I. MORE (LEFT) THEORY
A. Theory for Left Politics
1. Affirming Theory in Politics. Brown and Halley's
introduction frames the book's driving concern: that
"critique" is increasingly viewed as "an unaffordable luxury"
for left politics. 16 They describe a climate of left anti-
intellectualism that short circuits meaningful debate in
favor of incoherent "common sense,"'17  superficial
solidarity,' 8 and sentimentalized suffering. 19 Advocating
theory that is not directly subordinated to politics, they
argue "against a construction of the intellectual as a
political service worker. ' 20 They explain that the anthology
aims "to reinvigorate and revalue the tradition of critique
16. Brown & Halley, in LEFT LEGALISMILEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 4.
17. Id. at 2-3.
18. Id. at 3.




as vital to what the intellectual left has to offer, and,
perhaps to the very existence and health of the left itself."'21
Brown and Halley begin the book with a list of
complaints likely to sound uncomfortably familiar to
scholars who hope their work advances progressive politics.
For example: "What can all these abstractions do for a
woman living in a fifth-floor cold water walkup?";22 'Your
critique is so far removed from the language of the
courtroom or everyday politics that it can't possibly be of
practical value";23 "You couldn't possibly understand, not
being [fill in here the name of any congealed, subordinated
identity], and therefore lack authority to speak about the
needs of people bearing that identity."24 Brown and Halley
identify these complaints as part of a problem of anti-
intellectualism that has had the power to "slow down our
thinking and persuade us to mince words. ' 25 They present
this anthology as an effort to correct their own tendency to
cede conversation-stopping power to such comments. 26
To reclaim left intellectual power, Brown and Halley
have collected essays critically examining liberal law reform
projects that they believe have acquired "sacred cow
status."27 The book especially directs its criticism at legal
strategies focusing on antidiscrimination rights grounded in
race, gender, sexual orientation, or disability status. Brown
and Halley argue that the left may be rewarded not just
intellectually but also politically for brazenly opening the
door to more criticism of liberal sacred cows-like
affirmative action, sexual harassment protections, and gay
marriage-despite the loud and abundant attack on such
policies from the chorus of "wolves" outside the left.28
21. Id. at 4.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Id. at 2.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 3-4, 35-36.
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2. Affirming Politics in Theory. In defending an
autonomous space for theory against demands for political
accountability, the editors nonetheless stand far from the
conventional scholarly yearnings for theory anchored in
objectivity and impartiality. A postmodern commitment to
relentless, rigorous questioning of claims to transcendent
truth over contingent power inspires the book's challenge to
certainty and authority in both concrete politics and formal
principle. The editors explain, "[w]hat critique promises is
not objectivity but perspective; indeed critique is part of the
arsenal of intellectual movements of the past two centuries
that shatters the plausibility of objectivity claims once and
for all."'29
Instead, Brown and Halley astutely stake their claim
for theory's power and value-and pleasure-in
maintaining a tension between loosening and holding
theory's ties to politics. "Not knowing what a critique will
yield is not the same as suspending all political values
while engaged in critique,"30 noting, for example, that a
passionate vision of equality for sexual minorities can incite
and sustain criticism of various approaches to achieving
and defining that vision. 31 "[W]e are simultaneously
arguing for the politically enriching dimensions of critique
and against the direct subordination of critique to
politics." 32 Critique has the potential to bear political fruit,
in their analysis, "to the extent that it is unbridled from the
terms of the political problem that animate[s] it."
3 3
The editors' articulation of the tension between theory
and politics has energizing possibilities for both praxis and
theory that leans left-of-center. But by partly closing their
eyes to the broader political context that threatens both
practice and theory on the left-urging the "courage to open
29. Id. at 26.
30. Id. at 27.
31. Id. at 28.




the door ... as if the wolves were not there"34-the editors'
vision falls short of the book's ambitious aims.
3. Affirming Theory for Tough Politics. In explaining
why left politics needs hard-hitting critical theory, Brown
and Halley are not naive about the left's beleaguered
position in contemporary politics. Instead, they direct their
argument for the political usefulness of non-instrumental
critique to the particular demands of a politically unfriendly
context. The problem that grounds their vision is not that
law reform advocates make the "wrong" choice but that
politics so often consists of bad choices-double binds-that
seem to dig advocates into deeper conflicts with left ideals.35
Having lousy options, of course, is what it means to be
on the losing end of a power struggle. A retrospective look
back to policy choices made in better times shows that even
very promising reforms can turn out to be a powerful tool
for those who want to undermine the reformers' goals36-
because what matters is not law on the books but the messy
and uncertain world of law in action; action that is always
subject to power. Plausible reform strategies can all too
often end up reinforcing rather than subverting the
problems with the status quo. In the imperfect real world,
steps toward justice almost always come at the cost of
complicity with other injustices.37 In this context, left
activists who strive for political virtue are likely to end up
divided, exhausted, and immobilized.38
Critique, the editors explain, allows the left to give up
the pressure of pretending impossible purity and
authenticity and to instead embrace and up-end the
34. Id. at 36.
35. Id. at 29-31.
36. See generally Engle, supra note 10 (discussing how cases noted as
feminist victories may instead be regressive).
37. See Brown & Halley in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at
10-11 (giving the example of how the "left multiculturalist" goal of promoting
francophone sovereignty in Quebec would have created new forms of ethnic
oppression, such as renewed colonialism for First Nations people).
38. Id. at 28-29.
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"torments" of the left's political double binds. 39 The editors
note, for example, that while the mainstream debate over
gay marriage offers a choice between fueling hostility
against non-heterosexual sex on the one hand, and fueling
hostility against non-marital sex and intimacy on the other
hand, "critique affords us something to do besides voting for
'neither of the above.' 40
This emphasis on wrestling with double binds is
familiar territory in critical legal scholarship. 41 Much
feminist and critical race theory aims to both engage and
transcend the problematic choices offered by liberal
jurisprudence. 42 This literature has carefully analyzed, for
39. Id. at 30.
40. Id. at 29.
41. See Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double
Bind: The Illusory Choice of Motherhood, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 7-13
(2005) (defining the term and tracing its use from psychology to various
branches of critical legal theory); see also Mary Becker, Four Feminist
Theoretical Approaches and the Double Bind of Surrogacy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
303 (1993) (discussing reproductive surrogacy as an example of the problem
that feminist law reforms involve double binds); Martha T. McCluskey,
Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the
Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783 (2003) (showing how both liberal and
communitarian, neoliberal, and neoconservative branches of mainstream law
and policy create a double bind between "efficiency" and "redistribution"
grounded in a double standard of race, gender, and class). Critical theorist
Gayatri Spivak underscores this lesson of the "perennial critique" with the
phrase "qui gagne perd," or "who wins (also) loses." Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak, More on Power/Knowledge, in THE SPIVAK READER 161 (Donna Landry
& Gerald MacLean eds., 1996).
42. See, e.g, McCluskey, supra note 41, at 817-22 (explaining how analysis of
race, gender, and class bias at the heart of ideas about law and economics can
help reject mainstream law's double bind that pits economic growth against
economic equality); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 297 (1997) (challenging the liberal
framework of reproductive liberty that excludes reproductive equality by
defining liberty "to protect only the interests of the most privileged"); ELIZABETH
M. SCHNEIDER, BATrERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000) (exploring how
to push beyond the divides of public versus private, victimhood versus agency,
reasonable versus irrational); Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in
Abusive Families: Social Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for
Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13 (1995) (exploring double binds
faced by battered women and their advocates); John 0. Calmore, A Call to
Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of
Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1938 (1999) (explaining
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example, the costs on both sides of the conventional liberal
choice between equal treatment or different treatment,
integration or separation, autonomy or dependence,
victimhood or agency. 43 To break out of these confounding
double binds, much of this literature has worked at
"cracking the foundation myths" that undergird such bad
choices in hopes of opening up possibilities for different
choices more likely to advance progressive values.44 Critical
that double binds, featuring few options all of which penalize the chooser, are
an "ubiquitous feature of oppression"); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986) (challenging the unstated male norms that ground
the losing choice between special treatment and equal treatment for pregnant
workers); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term: Foreword: Justice
Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 11-15 (1987) (analyzing three "dilemma[s] of
difference" that confound much of liberal law and arguing that these dilemmas
can be resolved by unearthing and examining the unstated reference point that
constructs some particularity as "different"); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women
and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 9 (1989) (explaining how constitutional doctrine gives black women
a losing choice between being seen only as women or only as black).
43. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in
Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995) (discussing feminism's
conflict between asserting women's victimization or women's agency); Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, What Exactly is Racial Diversity?, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1149,
1157 (2003) (book review) (discussing how lack of diversity creates a racial
double bind where the token blacks are forced to become both more
representative of "their race" and more assimilating); Kevin R. Johnson,
'Melting Pot" or "Ring of Fire'? Assimilation and the Mexican-American
Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1305 (1997) (discussing the "Catch-22" of
"passing" as Anglo or claiming Latino identity); Thomas E. Kleven, Brown's
Lesson: To Integrate or Separate is Not the Question, But How to Achieve a Non-
Racist Society, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 43 (2005)
(challenging the choices offered in race discrimination doctrine); Martha T.
McCluskey, Rethinking Equality and Difference: Disability Discrimination in
Public Transportation, 97 YALE L.J. 863 (1988) (arguing that equality should
require challenging able-bodied norms, not choosing between sameness or
special accommodation); Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the
Nature of Antidiscrimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 564, 567 (1998) (criticizing
the equal/different treatment binary in the context of sexual orientation); see
also Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, S. CALIF. L. REV.
1699, 1700-04 (1990) (discussing double binds as the problem that "nonideal
justice" offers bad choices that idealistic approaches aim to dissolve, but that
"pragmatic" approaches confront).
44. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY
OF DEPENDENCY 7-54 (2004) (exploring and "cracking the foundational myths" of
autonomy and dependency that ground liberalism).
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feminist analysis, for example, has attempted to shift the
debate over family leave for working women away from a
question of the "equal treatment" of the workaholic track
and the "special treatment" of the mommy track. 45 In this
critical view, a broader reshaping of the legal meaning and
structure of work could escape this double bind by giving
workers in general better opportunities for combining
rewarding work with rewarding personal life. 46
Brown and Halley's anthology, in part, develops and
adds to this critical tradition, though it shortchanges this
existing literature in building its case against liberal
legalism.47 Sexuality is not the book's explicit or exclusive
focus, but the book particularly advances the critical legal
literature by collecting four chapters that struggle to escape
liberalism's binds on progressive visions of sexuality.48 For
45. See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REV. 861,
870-71 (1997) (explaining how feminist theory challenges the "mommy track[ ]"
by advocating not "differen[t]" treatment for women but instead confronting the
male privilege and power that structures the workplace and grounds ideas
about equality); Finley, supra note 42 (arguing that the sameness/difference
opposition can be transcended by structuring the workplace on the assumption
that it is normal for good workers to get pregnant and to care for children);
Martha T. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 115, 121-26 (explaining how feminist jurisprudence
challenged the "equal treatment/special treatment" problem with regard to
workers' family caretaking responsibilities).
46. See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 94-96 (2000) (advocating restructuring
work to avoid the problems of the "mommy track"); FINEMAN, supra note 44, at
241-62 (advocating changes in the workplace to respond to and facilitate a re-
organization of the family); Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881
(2000) (advocating an extensive improvement of workers' rights as the solution
to the problems faced by women workers with caretaking responsibilities);
Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law,
Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal
Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001) (challenging the biased liberal
binds between choice and constraint that undergird employment discrimination
law's failure to promote equality for caregiving women).
47. See infra notes 148, 193.
48. See Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT
CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 80; Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already
Heterosexual?, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 229; Michael
Warner, Beyond Gay Marriage, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 3,
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example, Judith Butler's chapter, Is Kinship Always
Already Heterosexual?, aims to push left visions of intimacy
beyond the fixation on the marital family that frames both
sides of the debate over gay marriage.
49
More generally, Brown and Halley enrich the critical
legal tradition by articulating the spiritual and hedonic
benefits that can come from intellectual struggles with such
double binds-even (or especially) when reframing public
policy debate to avoid those double binds seems implausible
in the foreseeable political future. Paradoxically, opening
the door to more skepticism, pain, and conflict from hard-
hitting critique can advance faith, pleasure, and
community. "It can interrupt the isolation of those silenced
or excluded by the binds of current legal or political
strategies; indeed, it can produce conversation in which
alternative political formations might be forged."50 Because
critique embodies a desire to "really . . . know how things
work and why, not just what principle we are supposed to
uphold, what line we are supposed to toe, what side we are
supposed to cheer," it "can free us from our all too
frequently cynical or despairing relationships to our most
deeply held values and rekindle the animating spirit of
those values."51 The editors stress that this freedom from
immobilizing binds, and those new or renewed connections
to beliefs and potential allies can be a source of personal
pleasure. This pleasure is more likely to mobilize and
sustain left activism against steep odds than what the
editors see as left politics' fetish for self-effacement and
suffering. 52
B. Theory for Left Law
The editors' strikingly extra-intellectual defense of
unmitigated intellectual zeal responds powerfully (though
at 259; Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT
CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 290.
49. Butler, supra note 48, at 229.
50. Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 31.
51. Id. at 30.
52. Id. at 32.
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not explicitly) to a crisis in legal theory. Resistance to far-
reaching critique is not just a problem of those progressives
who reject theory in favor of practical politics, but also of
the many contemporary non-conservatives-including some
former leading voices of left critical theory-who advocate
toning down left intellectual enthusiasm and ambition.
In the conventional wisdom, the critical legal studies
(CLS) movement that stirred legal academics from the mid-
1970s through the late 1980s is dead,53 the victim, at least
in part, of a self-inflicted overdose of high-flying theory.54
Mainstream and right-wing critics of CLS have long
condemned it (and its offshoots focusing on race and
gender) as nihilistic "trashing" of little practical use for the
legal profession or for progressive reform movements. 55
Indeed, a number of prominent and prolific scholars
associated with critical legal theory have accepted this
accusation and now advocate a chastened approach to left
legal theory that seeks to be less contentious and ambitious
and more content with the constraints of the day. 56
53. See Simon, supra note 4, at 175; DUXBURY, supra note 4, at 468 (by the
end of the 1980s, "critical legal studies seemed rather moribund").
54. See DUXBURY, supra note 4, at 476-501 (discussing the movement's
fascination and preoccupation with various abstract and utopian theories rather
than concrete reform ideas, and suggesting that CLS appeared to fall on its own
sword by turning back to liberal legalism when its members faced concrete
challenges to their authority).
55. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL. EDUC.
222, 227 (1984) (arguing that CLS proponents should leave legal academics
because their nihilistic cynicism is likely to produce "crooks" skilled in
"corruption: bribery and intimidation"); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law? 72
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986) (rejecting Carrington's outright dismissal of CLS
while criticizing CLS for its rejection of both law and morality). For a summary
and discussion of this strand of criticism of CLS, see DUXBURY, supra note 4, at
491-501.
56. See, e.g., John Henry Schlegel, But Pierre, If We Can't Think
Normatively, What Are We to Do?, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 955, 957 (2003)
(advocating shifting legal theory from the exercise of reason for normative
prescription about the Rule of Law to empirical description about the
bureaucratic constraints on the exercise of reason in law); see also DUXBURY,
supra note 4, at 502 (noting that some identified with CLS have joined the
trend toward pragmatism).
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1. Disciplining Theory for Non-Conservatives. According
to this chastened strand of CLS, if what passes as
principled reason in law is always beholden to partisan
power, then rigorous critique is a delusional answer to
problems of unjust power. If law's rational principles are
indeterminate and incoherent, or if legal principles are as
likely to constrain as to liberate, then why bother engaging
in more intellectual argument about how law is
unprincipled, or based on the wrong principles? 57 Following
this reasoning, theorizing about injustice may amount to
little more than a way for some people in mostly elite law
schools to earn a relatively privileged and pleasurable
living within the cogs of an unjust machine of power.58 Jack
Schlegel explains that CLS died to avoid being
"marginalized in the act of being included" (like legal
realism) as just another "of the possible perspectives . . . in
a law professor's kit bag ... that must be dragged out when
it comes time for any topic to be looked at from all sides-in
the name of fairness.5 9
Such disillusionment has led some away from critique
toward a modest and practical vision of intellectual work as
grease in the machine that can sometimes make life a little
smoother for at least some of the cogs. Schlegel, for
example, advocates that left intellectuals forgo the hubris of
prescribing policy and instead emphasize empirical
description of the mundane aspects of law and lawyering.60
In this vision, the political value of intellectual labor comes
from teaching lawyers and students "which fork to use" as
they enter the legal profession to gain or secure class
57. See Schlegel, supra note 56, at 956 (observing that as left legal scholars,
"[o]ur recurrent tactic is to hold a mirror to [some] legal practice, notice the
inequality that undermines the claim of law to be doing justice, shout "Politics!"
and follow that shout with a plea to vindicate the ideals of law").
58. See id. at 957 (considering that, since normative reasoning is a delusion,
one remaining purpose for normative legal scholarship might be to preserve a
"mandarin class that likes Thai food, fine wines, and Italian leather sofas").
59. John Henry Schlegel, Of Duncan, Peter, and Thomas Kuhn, 22 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1061, 1069-70 (2001).
60. Id. at 1071-72; Schlegel, supra note 56, at 962-69.
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privilege.61  Taking a similarly stinging critique of
normative principle in a different direction, Pierre Schlag
leads CLS sympathizers down a circular path of ambitious
legal reasoning about how ambitious legal reasoning is
dead.62
Others have taken disaffection with critical legal theory
in the direction of pragmatism, which holds on to normative
legal reasoning as a humble, contingent approach to policy
prescription. 63 In this view, theory is useful for calculating
which bad choices in the double binds constraining
progressive policy will produce the least costs to progressive
norms at a particular moment.64 This pragmatic turn
eschews quixotic challenges to the foundations of law and
policy, whether for the sake of principle or pleasure, and
instead pins its hopes on small, incremental, admittedly
compromised steps within the constraining walls of existing
61. Bob Gordon, Jack Schlegel, James May & Joan Williams, Colloquium:
Legal Education Then and Now: Changing Patterns in Legal Training and in
the Relationship of Law Schools to the World Around Them, 47 AM. U. L. REV.
747, 771-72 (1998) (comments of Jack Schlegel); see also Schlegel, supra note 56,
at 963-64 (advocating that critical left scholars turn their attention to
describing for those "not to the manor born" the fine details of legal practice).
62. See, e.g., PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM,
AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND (1996); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere
to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990).
63. For a discussion of the difference between Schlag's critique of
normativity and pragmatism's small-scale normativity, see Gary Minda,
Jurisprudence at Century's End, 43 J. LEGAL EDUc. 27, 38-39 (1993). For an
argument that CLS "offers little more than a politics of pragmatism," see
Goodrich, supra note 15, at 391. Richard Rorty, a leading proponent of
contemporary non-conservative philosophical pragmatism, argues that critical
theory is "a distraction from the history of concrete social engineering." Richard
Rorty, Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity, in HABERMAS AND MODERNITY
(Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1985). Responding to such challenges, critical theorist
Gayatri Spivak notes the "innocent arrogance" of Rorty's pragmatism: "the
project of the Enlightenment is considered altogether defensible if only taken
not as objectively and universally valid but as the cherished values of a
historically definable group, one's own." GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A
CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON: TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE VANISHING
PRESENT 345 (1999).
64. Radin, supra note 43, at 1699-1700 (summarizing pragmatism by saying
that "[w]e must look carefully at the nonideal circumstances in each case and
decide which horn of the dilemma is better (or less bad), and we must keep re-
deciding as time goes on").
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political exigencies. Joan Williams, for example, eschews
wholesale rethinking of the family and the economy in favor
of an approach to feminist reforms aiming to stretch
existing narrow liberal ideas of sex equality to protect
employees with family caretaking responsibilities. 6 5
Others are skeptical about the prospects for safety
(much less revolution) in such small steps, but nonetheless
join pragmatists in trying to bring abstract, postmodern left
critical theory down to earth to focus on practical
bargaining with the figurative devil (or with the wolves at
the door, as it were 66). Richard Delgado, for example, urges
turning critical race theory away from the etherial realm of
discussing discourse about racial justice to a strategic
consideration of how to harness and redirect the material
interests of those who benefit from white privilege.6 7
2. Affirming Theory for Left Critics. In contrast to all of
these approaches, however, Brown and Halley-and most of
the book's contributors-affirm the power of seemingly
impractical reasoning and radical visions even while
soundly rejecting faith in the force of normative principle
over power. Brown and Halley argue that intellectual
workers can wield power, not just service it, because
intellectual work does not necessarily depend on principled
persuasion for its power. 68  By creating pleasure,
community, and renewed commitment, transgressive
thinking can take on material force, even if the impact of
that force is not easily predictable. Unlike the left theorists
65. Joan Williams, Do Women Need Special Treatment? Do Feminists Need
Equality?, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 293 (1998) (differentiating her short
term strategic focus from what she sees as the more "utopian" approach to
caretaking policy advocated by Martha Fineman).
66. See text accompanying note 3.
67. Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination
of Recent Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2003) (book review); see also
Derrick A. Bell, Unintended Lessons in Brown v. Board of Education, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 1053 (2005) (arguing that racial justice depends not on empirical
proof of harm or on persuasive theoretical articulations of moral principles, but
on the convergence of white self-interested power and the interests of racialized
minorities).
68. See Brown & Halley in LEFr LEGALISM/LEFr CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at
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who preach (if not practice) intellectual chastity in the face
of indeterminacy and inconsistency, Brown and Halley
promote an intellectual passion that aspires not just to
enlighten or bribe opponents (or to secure a comfortable
academic salary69) but to arouse and re-orient dormant,
nascent, or conflicted political interests and allegiances
among potential allies.
The value of the book's varied policy prescriptions does
not depend on the unlikely possibility that a host of eager
lawmakers, lawyers, and activists stand ready to be
enlightened by the contributors' reasoning, however
rigorous.7 0 In his essay for the book, Duncan Kennedy takes
us off Schlag's treadmill by explaining that passion for
theory can persist or even grow from a lack of faith in
principled reason as the key to truth and justice.7 1 He
explains that even though good reasoning won't necessarily
convince others (or even ourselves) of the correctness or
causal impact of our policy positions, it can still enhance the
variety of resources (intellectual, social, emotional, and
ethical) from which we can "leap into commitment or
action" and presumably influence others to do so as well.
72
"Losing faith in theory doesn't mean giving up doing
theory-it just means giving up the expectation of rightness
in the doing."73 Kennedy describes an approach that moves
between skepticism and faith toward both left politics and
critique, blurring the division between principle and
strategy. 74
69. See Schlegel, supra note 56, at 967.
70. In affirming Pierre Schlag's withering critique of normative legal
reasoning, Jack Schlegel notes that "[e]ven the modest amount of evidence that
legal scholars have been heard suffers from the fact that it is easily capable of
being interpreted as an example of busy bureaucrats adding decorations to an
already over-trimmed Christmas tree . . . . [O]ne sees little evidence that the
arguments of legal academics are successful in persuading a decision maker
whose politics are not already sympathetic." Schlegel, supra note 56, at 960.
71. Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in
LEFr LEGALISMILEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 178, 220-23.
72. Id. at 222.
73. Id. at 221.
74. Id. at 220-24.
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Another contribution to the book offers a more concrete
example of how irreverent, non-instrumental theory can
foster politically beneficial pleasure, community, and
commitment. David Kennedy tells the story of his effort to
organize and sustain an academic group focusing on
questioning the intellectual foundations of international
law. 75 He concludes that the power of his effort came not
from producing any clear or coherent body of ideas or
policies but from more of a "spirit of new thinking [that]
lived for awhile for some people. ' 76 Kennedy compares the
value of this critical theory project to that of a good dance
performance: it was a shared experience that affirmed "that
dramatic things are possible ... that projects can find their
way to expression, that quotidian practices don't exhaust
the possible. ' 77 Kennedy observes that
"[y]ou can sometimes ignite someone's creative impulse by
providing a terrain that is not quite fully assimilated to the
establishment or the mainstream, that provides a safe hint of
ongoing opposition and possibility. Something terrific can happen
when people who share this sense find ways of telling one another,
of touching, itching, expressing the animus within."
7 8
By rooting theory's political power in a tension between
political commitment and skepticism, Left Legalism adds to
a larger body of work exploring the complex
interconnections between knowledge and action, ideas and
interests, or reason and emotion. The success of critical race
and gender theory in building an enthusiastic and
productive (if marginalized) intellectual movement through
the 1990s may in part be due to the success of these
branches of left critique in explicitly wrestling with the
interrelationship between theory and practice. 79 Reflecting
75. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking against the Box, in
LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 373-419.
76. Id. at 417.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and
Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821
(1997) (developing a theory of "critical race praxis" that would better bring
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on the history and future of critical race theory, for
example, insiders often discuss the political value of their
project in terms of building community or fostering joy.80
Connecting the early work of critical legal studies
movement to these later movements, Robert Gordon
explains that critical legal theory has persisting value as a
remedy for political passivity. Although abstract discussion
of ideas will not in itself alter the material power
arrangements that may matter most, the process of
reimagination "is a necessary first step" for mobilizing the
kind of political action that brings meaningful material
change.8' "People don't revolt because their situation is bad;
they can suffer in silence for centuries. They revolt when
their situation comes to seem unjust and alterable."8 2
Discussing literary theory, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
similarly analyzes critique's affective qualities and points to
together lawyers, activists, and critical race theorists); Martha R. Mahoney,
Whiteness and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Response to Catharine
MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. FEMINISM 217, 247-49 (1993) (exploring how the
problematic dichotomy between feminist theory and practice works to obscure
white racial privilege); Margaret M. Russell, Entering Great America:
Reflections on Race and the Convergence of Progressive Legal Theory and
Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 749 (1992) (analyzing the interworkings of theory
and practice using the example of racial profiling); Cynthia Grant Bowman &
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, and the
Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249 (1998) (analyzing how theory can
only be understood through political practice, and practice through theory).
Gayatri Spivak has extensively theorized the problematic divide between theory
and practice in the context of feminist and postcolonial studies. See, e.g., SPIVAK,
supra note 63, at 1-34 (critiquing the Kantian construction of the rational "man"
in opposition to the "raw" and primitive native, identified in terms of race,
geography, economics, and gender).
80. Charles R. Lawrence III, Who Are We? And Why Are We Here? Doing
Critical Race Theory in Hard Times, Foreword to CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND
A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 9, at xix (concluding that "we struggle
because that is what gives life meaning, that is what gives us joy" and that we
are together because "collectively we are a nuclear explosion of beauty");
Francisco Valdes, Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: Coalitional Method and
Comparative Jurisprudential Experience-RaceCrits, QueerCrits, and LatCrits,
Afterword to 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (1999) (analyzing the relationship
between theory and community-building among "outsider" scholars).
81. Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in
THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 657 (David Kairys ed., 1998).
82. Id.
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its possibilities for producing and proliferating hope from a
position that foregrounds uncertainty and contingency.
83
Critical theory can create "room to realize that the future
may be different from the present" and to "entertain such
profoundly painful, profoundly relieving, ethically crucial
possibilities as that the past, in turn, could have happened
differently from the way it did."
8 4
C. Theory for Right-Wing Politics
The Right's success over the last several decades in
both politics and jurisprudence supports Left Legalism's
claim for the political power of iconoclastic theory. However,
the Right's success offers a warning against Left Legalism's
tendency to analyze theory primarily as a matter of
individual moral and intellectual fiber rather than as a
matter of institutionalized political economy.
1. Affirming Theory in Right Politics. The Right's rise in
power may strengthen the book's case for theory as an
elementary need, not an "unaffordable luxury," for the left
at the start of the 21st century.8 5 While many non-
conservative legal scholars and activists have been
bemoaning the limited value of theory,8 6 their right-wing
counterparts have been bidding up its price by investing
staggering amounts of money in theoretical scholarship,
and particularly in legal theory.8 7 Moreover, to a large
83. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, TOUCHING FEELING: AFFECT, PEDAGOGY,
PERFORMATIVITY 13-21 (2003).
84. Id. at 146.
85. Brown & Halley in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 4
(stating the book's purpose as challenging the increasing characterization of
critique as an unaffordable luxury for left politics).
86. See supra part I.B.
87. See DAVID CALLAHAN, NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIVE
PHILANTHROPY [hereinafter "NCRP"], $1 BILLION FOR IDEAS: CONSERVATIVE
THINK TANKS IN THE 1990S (1999) (describing how right-wing funders have spent
almost $1 billion over that decade to make right-wing theory the prevailing
source of public policy ideas); JEFF KREHELY ET AL., NCRP, Axis OF IDEOLOGY:
CONSERVATIVE FOUNDATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 10, 26 (2004) (estimating total
conservative grantmaking by 2001 at $1.8 billion and finding over $20 million
given to universities for specifically conservative research during the 2000-2003
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extent right-wing politics has embraced precisely the
tension between committed politics and unconfined theory
that Halley and Brown urge on the left.
In the 1970s, a number of wealthy right-wing activists
organized to make theory a basic part of their political
strategy.88 One leader of this political campaign, former
Republican Treasury Secretary William E. Simon, wrote
two best-selling books outlining a strategy which he then
implemented as a longtime president of the John M. Olin
Foundation.8 9 Simon argued that "[t]he alliance between
the theorists and men of action in the capitalist world is
long overdue in America. It must become a veritable
crusade if we are to survive in freedom." 90 Simon further
period alone); see also Lewis H. Lapham, Tentacles of Rage: The Republican
Propaganda Mill, A Brief History, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Sept. 2004, at 31, 32
(reporting that former Democratic political strategist Rob Stein estimated the
funding for conservative ideas at roughly $3 billion over 30 years); Jon Hanson
& David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character,
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129,
272-76 (2003) (discussing the importance of conservative funding in the
production and shaping of recent legal theory); MICHAEL PATRICK ALLEN, THE
FOUNDING FORTUNES: A NEW ANATOMY OF THE SUPER-RICH FAMILIES IN AMERICA
(1987) (finding $88 million in funding for development of politically conservative
ideas from 1977-1986).
88. James Piereson, Opinion, You Get What You Pay For, WALL ST. J., July
21, 2004 at A10 (describing, from viewpoint of executive director of the Olin
Foundation, how the conservative foundation movement "took shape ... in the
mid-1970s when Irving Kristol penned a series of articles in the Wall Street
Journal challenging businessmen to use their charitable funds to strengthen
the system of private enterprise and limited government" and when William E.
Simon made a similar plea in a best-selling book); see also, Lapham, supra note
87, at 32 (describing and criticizing "the nature and extent of the re-education
program undertaken in the early 1970s by a cadre of ultraconservative and self-
mythologizing millionaires bent on rescuing the country from the hideous grasp
of Satanic liberalism"). Michael Joyce, President of the conservative Lynde and
Harry Bradley Foundation, directed millions toward funding intellectual work
in mostly elite universities because he "believes that investment in academia is
vital to the long-term success of the conservative movement." PEOPLE FOR THE
AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION, BUYING A MOVEMENT: RIGHT-WING FOUNDATIONS
AND AMERICAN POLITICS 16 (1996) [hereinafter "PFAW"].
89. See WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR ACTION (1980) [hereinafter SIMON,
ACTION]; WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR TRUTH (1978) [hereinafter SIMON,
TRUTH]; see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 87, at 275-77 (discussing Simon's
leadership of the Olin Foundation).
90. SIMON, TRUTH, supra note 89, at 233.
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argued that corporate profits needed to "rush by [the]
multimillions 91 to provide "intellectual refuges for the non-
egalitarian scholars and writers ... [who] must be given
grants, grants and more grants in exchange for books,
books and more books. ' 92 Simon explained that the goal
must not just be to take sides in existing controversies, but
to open up the "basic premises of these controversies" for
debate and to produce a new "counterintelligentsia" capable
of setting the terms of the debate. 93 Simon argued that the
goal of this "mobilization" of intellectuals must be "to raise
the unnamed issues, to ask the unasked questions, to
present the missing contexts, and to place a set of very
different values and goals on the public agenda."94 Simon's
work built on a similar well-publicized call for right-wing
theory by Lewis Powell in 1971, shortly before his
appointment to the Supreme Court. 95 Working with the
Chamber of Commerce, Powell advocated an organized
system of financial support for conservative scholars,
media, educational textbooks, and public speakers who
could promote American free-enterprise and develop an
attack on political "liberals. ' 96
At a 2002 meeting of a group of conservative
foundations that had spent the prior two decades
implementing this blueprint, one speaker reflected that the
right's decision to turn from the conventional "bricks-and-
mortar" donations to an approach designed to "leverage"
ideas has paid off handsomely. 97 For a mere $70 million a
91. Id. at 230.
92. Id. at 231. Also discussed in Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 87, at 276.
93. SIMON, TRUTH, supra note 89, at 233-34.
94. Id.
95. KREHELY, supra note 87, at 9.
96. Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B.
Sydnor, Jr. (Aug. 23, 1971) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
97. Robert Kuttner, Philanthropy and Movements, AMERICAN PROSPECT, July




year, the speaker gloated, these groups have changed the
course of American politics.98
Legal theory was at the center of this radical vision to
mobilize intellectuals for the right. By the end of the
twentieth century, the Olin Foundation, under William E.
Simon's leadership, had made an "investment" of around
$50 million in "law-and-economics" scholarship. 99 Looking
back at that foundation's history, the succeeding executive
director James Piereson attributed its success in
maximizing political "dividends" to its strategic "investment
in ideas."100 According to Piereson, the Olin Foundation was
designed to heed a "call to arms" in "defense of
capitalism." 101 Right-wing leaders realized that this defense
of "commercial civilization" required a "full-blown
engagement with the world of ideas" that would discuss not
just business but "deeper cultural assumptions" about the
"rule of law, religion, the family and the evolution of our
political institutions."' 10 2
2. Affirming Radical Politics in Right Theory. This
political strategy for mobilizing aggressively ideological
theoretical work differs sharply from the approach to
scholarship that has predominated outside right-wing
circles. Although a number of non-conservative foundations
funding intellectual work are wealthier,10 3 "most . . . are
centrist, and their philanthropy is cautious and
apolitical"104  and certainly very few if any major
foundations have ever come close to overtly advancing a
98. Id. (noting that Herzog, who is a wealthy owner of significant interest in
The New Republic, is known as a relatively moderate "velvet" conservative but
who at this meeting extolled a radical conservative politics).
99. WILLIAM E. SIMON, A TIME FOR REFLECTION: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 272
(2004).
100. Piereson, supra note 88.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Shawn Zeller, Conservative Crusaders, 35 NAT'L J. 1286-87, 1290
(2003).




strong left (rather than "liberal') politics.105 Some
substantial supporters of U.S. scholarship on public policy
have roots in progressive era law reform movements-for
example the Russell Sage Foundation, the Twentieth
Century Fund (now renamed The Century Foundation), and
the Brookings Institution. 06 Consistent with their roots,
however, such organizations have tended to support a
vision of scholarship as technical expertise that draws on
neutral social science methods to develop pragmatic
solutions to policy problems. 0 7 In general, non-right-wing
foundations envision the mission of intellectual work as
minimizing, softening, or resolving breaches in a presumed
moral and political consensus about the foundational
principles of society.108 The Henry J. Kaiser Family
Foundation, for example, devotes substantial resources to
health policy reform but describes itself not as an "advocacy
group" but as a "purveyor of credible and objective research
... from all sides of the ideological spectrum."'10 9 Similarly,
although the Pew Charitable Trust pours substantial
resources to support scholarly involvement in issue
advocacy, it aims to "fund thinkers on all sides of the
debate" trusting that the best idea will then win. 110
In contrast, William E. Simon's plan for building a late-
twentieth century conservative counterintelligentsia set as
the basic principle that "philanthropy must not capitulate
to soft-minded pleas for the support of 'dissent"' and that
capitalists must not let their foundations finance "the
105. Indeed, some research suggests that major foundation support for left-
leaning sociolegal reform movements in the 1960s and 1970s served to move
these groups toward the political center and away from grassroots activism. See
id. at 208-13 (giving example of funding of voting rights and women's rights
movements); see also id. at 201-02 (discussing the small number of less wealthy
foundations focused on more radical left political activism).
106. CALLAHAN, supra note 87, at 9.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also Kuttner, supra note 97, at 3.
109. Zeller, supra note 103, at 1290 (quoting Henry J. Kaiser Family




intellectual opposition" in the interests of "fairness."11 '
Given this difference in approach to funding theory, it is not
surprising that, as Stanford Law Professor William H.
Simon 1 2 finds, "[t]here is nothing in centrist or left-of-
center legal scholarship with a level of coherence, mutual
engagement, and ideological commitment comparable to
those of legal conservatism." 113
Following their view of theory as part of foundation-
shaking, consciously revolutionary political mission,114 the
right-wing foundations have enhanced the institutional
connections between scholarship and practical politics
through two methods that differ from their "more genteel"
centrist and "liberal" counterparts. 11 5 First, the new
conservative foundations solidified and sustained a strong
ideological direction in the scholarship they funded by
rejecting the governance structure common among long-
established centrist groups like the Ford Foundation, which
tended to disperse control among a large and diverse group
of board members and staff with a broader range of
viewpoints and backgrounds than their founders."16
Instead, wealthy conservative activists structured their
foundations to centralize control among a small,
interlocking group of business executives sharing a sharply
focused political vision. 117 According to a scholar of
contemporary U.S. philanthropy:
[t]he fact is that mainline foundations are not in the philanthropy
game to win hearts and minds or to create new orthodoxies-both
111. SIMON, TRUTH, supra note 89, at 230.
112. Not to be confused with former Treasury Secretary and Olin
Foundation Director William E. Simon.
113. Simon, supra note 4, at 175.
114. For discussions of the unapologetically radical political focus of this
conservative funding movement, see DOWIE, supra note 104, at 216-17; SIMON,
TRUTH, supra note 89; Kuttner, supra note 97.
115. CALLAHAN, supra note 87, at 9.
116. DOWIE, supra note 104, at 217; Piereson, supra note 88.
117. James Piereson, The Insider's Guide to Spend Down: Switching Off the
Lights at the Olin Foundation, PHILANTHROPY ROUNDTABLE, March/April 2002
at 23-24; CALLAHAN, supra note 87; KREHELY, supra note 87, at 54-55 (noting
the small size and interactive approach of conservative foundation boards).
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central objectives of the consistently ideological foundations of the
Right whose trustees and staffs are of one mind and pretty much
of one class.. Politically balanced boards of trustees create
politically neutral foundations. 1
18
In a second tactic for bridging the gap between
scholarship and politics, the new right-wing funding for
intellectuals has included substantial resources devoted to
marketing theoretical work to popular media, lobbyists,
grassroots activists, lawyers, politicians, and judges. 119
Scholarship, in this view, is not a collegial quest for truth or
pleasure (and not simply a way to provide a nice middle-
class income and lifestyle for academics120). Instead, leading
contemporary right-wing activists have viewed intellectual
work as part of a strategic business plan that can produce
large returns for their donors in a tough competition for
power and profit. 21 For example, individual donors to the
right-wing Hudson Institute are designated "investors" on
the think tank's web site, where they can click on an
"investment impact button" that lists the policy areas in
which donors are promised a "real world impact."122
As a particularly important part of their plan for
ensuring theory's impact, conservative "venture
capital[ists]" developed a large network of interconnected
think tanks. 23 In the 1990s, these right-wing think tanks
spent over one billion dollars, and had become "the key
generator and purveyor of public ideas," according to a
study by liberal philanthropists. 124 One of these, the
118. DOWIE, supra note 104, at 218.
119. Kuttner, supra note 97 (reporting that Edwin Feulner of the Heritage
Foundation emphasized support for marketing as one of four keys to successful
conservative funding); CALLAHAN, supra note 86; PFAW, supra note 87.
120. See Schlegel, supra note 56, at 956.
121. See Kuttner, supra note 97 (describing boasting from conservative
funders about using philanthropy as a strategic investment with high leverage).
122. Hudson Institute Investment Impact, available at http://www.
hudson.org/invest/ index.cfm?fuseaction=investmentlimpact (last visited Oct. 1,
2006).
123. Zeller, supra note 103, at 1290.
124. CALLAHAN, supra note 87.
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Heritage Foundation, explains its power by noting that
'traditional' think tanks cling to the notion that their work
will leave its imprint on Washington through a process of
osmosis. Heritage efforts are deliberate and
straightforward."' 125  Twenty percent of the Heritage
Foundation's 2002 spending, for example, went to media
and government relations and another twenty-one percent
went to educational programs.126  Similarly, the
conservative John M. Olin Foundation funds not only the
production of ideas in think tanks, law schools, law
professors, law students, and Law and Economics theory
workshops, but also spends lavishly to disseminate and
implement these ideas through conservative publications,
public interest law firms, judicial training, and, through
their board members and senior staff, Republican political
candidates.127
In contrast, a spokesman for the centrist Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation explained that it steered clear of
political activism and instead aimed to "provide information
to government agencies . . . when they request it. ' ' 128
Centrist or liberal foundations "promote policies piecemeal,"
but "[y]ou would never hear senior officers of big
mainstream foundations talking about building a [political]
movement" with the scholarship they fund. 29
125. Id. (quoting Heritage Foundation Annual Report). A vice president of
the conservative Heritage Foundation reported that his group differs from
traditional think tanks like the Brookings Institute, by adopting "the intense
marketing and issue management capabilities of an activist organization."
DOWIE, supra note 104, at 216 (quoting Stuart Butler).
126. KREHELY, supra note 87, at 19.
127. See PFAW, supra note 88, at 18-20; JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD
DELGADO, No MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS
CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA 49-79 (1996) (detailing, for example, how
conservative foundations, including the Olin Foundation, helped turn political
opinion against racial affirmative action by linking conservative scholarship to
funding for the Washington Legal Foundation, the Center for Individual Rights,
the Heritage Foundation, the Manhattan Institute, the Center for Equal
Opportunity, the American Enterprise Institute, the Hoover Institution, the
Cato Institute (for a time), the Hudson Institute, the Heartland Institute, and
the Institute for Justice).
128. Zeller, supra note 103, at 1287-88.
129. Kuttner, supra note 97, at 3.
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3. Affirming Right-Wing Theory for Tough Politics.
Along with a strategy that institutionalizes the integration
of theory and politics, the Right has simultaneously
pursued a strategy of separating theory from politics,
successfully embracing the tension that Brown and Halley
hope to capture. The right-wing funders often have taken a
long-term, hands-off, and high-risk approach to their
investment in theory, thereby encouraging internal debate
and a diversity of policy strategies. 130
Non-right-wing foundations and donors tend to require
extensive monitoring, evaluation, and documentation of the
policy impact of their grants.13' In contrast, the more
conservative foundations tend to eschew quantitative
measures and strict accountability in favor of "a blank
check" approach that tells grantees to "follow your heart."132
By nurturing institutions and individuals rather than
focusing on discrete projects, right-wing funders have
combined direct, centralized governance of the general
ideological direction of their spending133-with substantial
freedom and flexibility for the scholars who benefit from
their funds. By providing general operational support over
several decades, conservative funders have encouraged
intellectuals and institutions to be entrepreneurs and
incubators, not political servants or technicians.13 4
For example, beginning in the mid 1980s, right-wing
foundations gave generously to build the Federalist
Society 35 into a group able to spend around $5 million a
130. See KREHELY, supra note 87, at 11.
131. See Zeller, supra note at 103, at 1291; see also KREHELY, supra note 87,
at 42.
132. Zeller, supra note 103, at 1291; see KREHELY, supra note 87, at 54.
133. See supra note 116.
134. See CALLAHAN, supra note 87; see also PFAW, supra note 88; KREHELY,
supra note 87, at 16; DOWIE, supra note 104, at 217 (noting that conservative
foundations use separate think tanks to offer scholars "the very intellectual
freedom they so vigorously sought to deny American universities.")
135. See PFAW, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: FROM OBSCURITY TO POWER 6-8
(2001) (discussing "millions" of dollars in contributions from the John M. Olin
Foundation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Sarah Scaife
Foundation and the Charles G. Koch Foundations); KREHELY, supra note 87, at
11 (noting the Olin Foundation's long-term strategic support of the Federalist
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year 136 on intellectual networking aimed at "reforming the
legal order."'137 The group's donation web page touts the
political and market value of a theoretical focus removed
from practical demands, stressing the group's success in"shift[ing] the very terms of the debate. ' 138  "While
candidates, political races, and the issues of the day emerge
and exhaust themselves fairly quickly, the effort to renew
our intellectual and philosophical tradition is constant and
ongoing."'139 As that group's web site tells prospective
donors, an "investment in the Federalist Society will have a
sustained impact for years to come."1 40
Similarly, the Olin Foundation has made the
development of the Law and Economics branch of legal
theory a long-term priority over the last twenty years.' 4' A
founding organizer of this right-wing legal theory reflected
that the field might have fizzled out in the late 1970s or
early 1980s if John M. Olin had not decided to use his gun
and chemical company wealth to fund academic fellows who
could promote a conservative economic vision. 42 After
Olin's death, the John M. Olin Foundation continued and
expanded its "enormous" financial support for Law and
Society, beginning with a small group of law students, and amounting to about
$2 million dollars over 20 years); Michael Fletcher, What the Federalist Society
Stands For, WASH. POST, July 29, 2005, at A21 (reporting support for the group
from leading conservative foundations as well as from major corporations such
as Verizon, Microsoft, and DaimlerChrysler).
136. Fletcher, supra note 135, at A21; see also INST. FOR DEMOCRACY
STUDIES, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE CHALLENGE TO A DEMOCRATIC
JURISPRUDENCE 2 (2001) (reporting, based on earlier data, a $3 million annual
budget).
137. The Federalist Society: Background, http://www.fed-soc.org/our
background.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
138. Eugene B. Meyer, President, The Federalist Society: Why Give,
http://www.fed-soc.org/whytogive.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Grant Programs,
http://www.jmof.org/grantprograms.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
142. See Henry G. Manne, How Law and Economics Was Marketed in a
Hostile World: A Very Personal History, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS:
ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 309, 322-23 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K.
Roley eds., 2005) (noting how "very expensive" this fellowship program was).
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Economics scholarship with the effect of producing "an
organized program in every major law school in the country
(and several in Canada)" by 1986, along with numerous
journals, textbooks, and conferences. 143 By the 1990s, this
support had continued to develop into a prominent
professional society and a specialized law school (George
Mason), with the result that "[n]o other intellectual
paradigm in legal education could begin to match the power
of law and economics."'1
44
In another example of long-term investments in
intellectual production, right-wing activists have also
heavily funded conservative Christian legal scholarship,
which is now claiming a place as a significant branch of
contemporary jurisprudence. 145  Although religious
institutions have long played an important role in legal
academics, these new investments in Christian law take a
distinctly comprehensive, ideological, and fundamentalist
approach. In contrast to past religious commentary on
specific legal issues like abortion or poverty, this new
Christian theory aims to rethink the foundations of
American law. In 1978, Pat Robertson founded Regents
University Law School (using profits from his Christian
Broadcasting Network) 146 to "integrate biblical principles"
into the teaching and practice of law. 147 In 2000, anti-
abortion activist Tom Monaghan used his Dominos Pizza
wealth to open the Ave Maria School of Law, which
promotes natural law jurisprudence based on what its
leaders view as the traditional Roman Catholic moral
143. Id. at 322, 323.
144. Id. at 326; see also Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 87, at 273-76 (arguing
that the dramatic success of the Law and Economics scholarship was pivotally
influenced by the Olin Foundation's long-term strategic investment designed to
produce a rightward shift in the politics of legal theory).
145. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W.
McConnell et al. eds., 2001); see also William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal Theory,
116 HARv. L. REV. 1707 (2003).
146. Harvey Cox, The Warring Visions of the Religious Right, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Nov. 1995, at 59.
147. Jeffrey A. Brauch, It Sounded Great in the Glossy Brochure ...So
Where Is It? Carrying Out the Mission at a Mission Driven Law School, 33 U.
TOL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001).
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order. 148 In 2004, the first class of students entered Liberty
University School of Law, which Jerry Falwell established
to train what he hoped would be Christian "conservative
warriors" mobilized against groups like the ACLU. 149 In
2000, the Olin Foundation joined with other conservative
funders to start the James Madison Program in American
Ideals and Institutions under the leadership of
jurisprudence scholar and political activist Robert
George. 150 This center operates as a semi-independent
conservative think tank within Princeton University and
has helped to promote George's conservative Christian
natural law theories as well as right-wing policies on topics
like sexuality and immigration.151
Another aspect of right-wing legal activism that is
consistent with Brown and Halley's vision of theory is the
emphasis on fostering decidedly impractical scholarship.
Right-wing activists have directed their investment in
theory particularly toward promoting ideas that (at the
outset) are likely to seem unorthodox, utopian, and
immodest in mainstream policy and theory-privatizing
social security and public education, or even rolling back
the whole New Deal administrative and welfare state. 52 In
148. See M.L. Elrick, Higher Law, NAT'L LAW J., May 14, 2001, at A18; see
also Jim Suhr, Pizza Magnate Puts His Fortune Where his Faith Is, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 10, 2001, §2, at 8; see also CALLAHAN, supra note 88, at 25 (discussing
Monaghan's funding to promote both scholarship and political activism,
including the radical anti-abortion group Operation Rescue).
149. See David A. Bernstein, The Christian Right: Jerry Falwell's War on
the ACLU, BOSTON PHOENIX, Aug. 27-Sept. 2, 2004.
150. See Max Blumenthal, Princeton Tilts Right, THE NATION, Mar. 13,
2006, at 11, 16 (reporting that Olin contributed $525,000 in startup funds, and
that other major donors since then have included the Bradley Foundation, the
family of Republican presidential candidate Steve Forbes, and several
conservative Catholic activist groups).
151. See id. at 18-19 (noting that because the Program does not depend on
University funding, the director and funders-represented on the Program's
advisory council-have unusual power to ensure fellowships and events are
determined by political rather than academic criteria).
152. See Zeller, supra note 103, at 1286; see also Jeffrey Rosen, The
Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE Apr. 17, 2005, at 42 (discussing
how conservative activists have used think tanks in an effort to transform the
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a comment that could be mistaken for postmodern thinking,
former Regent University Law School Dean Herb Titus
defended his use of far-fetched legal arguments supporting
judicial display of the Ten Commandments by explaining
that "[p]ragmatists are the most impractical persons I know
because they base their decisions on what they think the
future will be, and no one knows what the future will be."'153
An Olin Foundation program officer explains that they are
"wary of supporting endeavors that preach to the choir."'154
Instead, right-of-center foundations are "looking for people
who are making new arguments and are 'getting noticed,
shaping the agenda, and moving the ball down the field."' 155
Furthermore, conservative funders often emphasize the
emotional, aesthetic, and spiritual aspects of their
investment in theory. For example, conservative leaders
promote scholarship not just to rationally persuade liberal
or centrist policymakers to adopt particular policies, but to
cultivate the social support and recognition useful in
building and sustaining organized political commitments. 156
In addition to long-term financial and social support for
ambitious theory, the right-wing's strategy has emphasized
collaboration across scholarly and political divisions. Right-
wing activist William E. Simon argued that wealthy
conservatives must ensure that tight philosophical
restrictions on academic grantees nonetheless recognize
and support the "enormous diversity of viewpoints within
fundamental assumptions about law established in the New Deal era of the
20th Century).
153. Eddie Curran, Moore's Audacious Attorney [or, Losing Your Case on
Purpose], FREE REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 2003, http://www.freerepublic.com
focus/news/973677/psts?page=l.
154. Zeller, supra note 103, at 1287.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 138 (describing how the group aims to
correct the problem that many conservative law students often felt alone or
confronted with hostility and indifference). Regent University's law courses and
lectures cultivate their students not just with biblical passages but with
religious music. See Cox, supra note 146, at 61 (noting he could not imagine the
gospel singing that accompanied his lecture at Regent taking place at a
Harvard lecture); see also, Regent University Law School's Mission is to
Integrate the Will of God and the Nation's Law, NPR radio broadcast (May 6,
2005) (discussing a constitutional law class that opens with a hymn).
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the center-to-right intellectual world which endorses
capitalism."'157 Working together through an interlocking
network of funding, board members, and staff, libertarian
and conservative groups smoothly meld arguments about
free-market liberty and authoritarian morality to
rationalize reforms in areas like social security, education,
welfare, and tort law. 158  For example, although the
neoliberal Cato Institute takes opposing positions from the
neoconservative Heritage Foundation on a few issues like
gay rights, 59 it has drawn substantial support from several
of the leading funders of groups (like Heritage) at the fore of
the campaign for "conservative morals" (the Sarah Scaife
Foundation, the Lynne and Harry Bradley Foundation, and
the Castle Rock Foundation). 160 In turn, the Charles A.
Lambe foundation, a leading funder of Cato's
libertarianism, is also a major supporter of the Heritage
Foundation's moralistic conservatism.'
6'
Besides fostering and bridging internal diversity, right-
wing academic and research institutions have avoided
ideological purity or authenticity by supporting and
reaching out to centrists, liberals, and new scholars likely to
157. SIMON, TRUTH, supra note 89, at 231.
158. See generally McCluskey, supra note 41 (showing the connections
between economic (neoliberal) and social (communitarian) conservative politics
directed at undermining the welfare and regulatory state in the late 20th
century); STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 127 (discussing the centrality of
pro-business conservative economic politics to changing "America's social
agenda" on issues such as affirmative action, welfare, "English only," and
eugenics).
159. See Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL
152342 (arguing that criminalization of same-sex sodomy violates constitutional
privacy protections); see also Robert P. George, Judicial Usurpation and the
Constitution, in HERITAGE LECTURES (Lecture #871, Feb. 17, 2005) (comparing
the Supreme Court's rulings extending the right to privacy to include abortion
and same-sex sodomy to the infamous decisions of Plessy and Dred Scott).
160. See Media Transparency Project, Recipient Grants: Cato Institute,
http://www.mediatransparency.org/recipientgrants.php?recipientID=51 (last
visited Oct. 1, 2006). The Scaife foundation restricts its Cato grants to certain
issues. See STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 127, at 69.
161. See Media Transparency Project, Claude R. Lambe Charitable
Foundation Grant Recipients, http://www.mediatransparency.org/recipientsof
under.php?funderlD=8 (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
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be receptive to some of their positions or at least to some of
their largesse. 162  For example, institutions like the
Federalist Society and Regent University's law school build
a reputation for intellectual legitimacy and openness by
inviting liberal and centrist scholars to share their views. 163
By supporting the occasional pro-welfare, pro-regulatory, or
pro-equality liberal-while clearly keeping left economics
out of the debate-Olin money in law schools can appear to
be driven by neutral pursuit of knowledge rather than by a
political movement. 164
D. Critique of Theory's Politics
Even if ambitious, iconoclastic, and committed theory
has nourished the growing muscle of the right-wing"wolves" who attack progressive policies, does that mean a
similar dose of more irreverent theory would ease the
problems confronting a left-wing vision of justice? In its
vision of how the left might burst the binds of liberal
legalism, Left Legalism's call for more theory takes an oddly
uncritical approach to the politics of theory.
The book stands for the hope that by modeling the
diverse possibilities for theorizing beyond liberal law, they
will encourage more of such theory. 165 But, as their opening
162. See Kuttner, supra note 97 (explaining why the right-wing network of
foundations and think tanks "makes great efforts to co-opt New Democrats.").
163. See Cox, supra note 146, at 60-61 (describing his warm reception from
Regents Law School even though he is a liberal theologist); see also INSTITUTE
FOR DEMOCRACY STUDIES, supra note 136; Federalist Society, What People are
Saying, http://www.fed-soc.org/whatpeoplearesaying.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2006) (Federalist Society web page featuring praise for its openness by leading
centrist or liberal legal scholars such as Cass Sunstein, Sanford Levinson, and
Nadine Strossen).
164. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Right-Wing Olin Foundation, Major Benefactor
of Law and Economics, is Closing Up Shop, Leiter Reports: A Group Blog, (May
30, 2005) http:/Ileiterreports.typepad.comblog/2005/05/index.html (last visited
October 1, 2006) ("The only redeeming aspect of the Olin Foundation's history is
that, at least with law schools, they gave the money and stayed away. That
meant that liberals like Ian Ayres (Yale) and Gillian Hadfield (USC) could feed
at the trough, even if the conservatives outnumbered them.")
165. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 36.
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list of left activists' challenges to critical theory suggests, 166
the problem may not be a lack of recognizable models of left
intellectual challenges to liberalism but the fact that
existing prominent left theories have often inspired
antipathy or apathy among those on the left they hope to
court.
1. Castigating Left Character. Considering why critique
gets such poor reception among progressive activists, Brown
and Halley portray left activists and scholars as beset by
emotional, moral, and intellectual weakness. They castigate"suffer-mongerers"'16 7  for an "unstinting, self-effacing
devotion to a cause of misery" that regards with suspicion
"any pleasure taken in intellectual or political work."'168
They challenge the simplistic reasoning of those who treat
liberal law as just a "tool" for implementing left goals
without recognizing how liberalism is itself a politics that
redirects and constrains those goals. 69 They complain of
the "orthodox[y] often locked into left thinking."'17 They
demand more "courage" in the face of the "wolves" at the
door. 171
Compare Brown and Halley's analysis of the left's
problem with a similar call to intellectual arms against
liberal legalism on the right. Like Brown and Halley, in the
late 1970s, William E. Simon and other conservative
activists directly challenged the then-dominant liberal legal
framework and particularly urged theoretical work aimed
at rejecting the ascendancy in the 1960s of ideas of justice
centered on the civil rights and the regulatory state
models. 172 But ironically, this right-wing attack on liberal
legalism analyzed insufficient right theory not as a problem
of conservatives' weak character, bad humor, or shaky
intellect, but as a problem of the systemic political economy
166. See id. at 2-3.
167. Id. at 33.
168. Id. at 32.
169. Id. at 23-24.
170. Id. at 35.
171. Id. at 36.
172. See SIMON, TRUTH, supra note 89, and accompanying text.
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of ideas. Though Simon bemoaned the weakness of right-
wing intellectuals, he explained this weakness as a problem
of being an "impoverished underground" in an academic
world dominated by the left.173 As a solution, Simon urged
fellow conservatives not to scold or persuade too-cautious
intellectuals, but to pay them to take more risks against the
liberal establishment. "I know of nothing more crucial than
to come to the aid of the intellectuals and writers who are
fighting on my side," Simon said, 174 by giving them money
to ensure their ability to better compete in the marketplace
of ideas. 175
If, as Brown and Halley argue, progressive intellectuals
should not be "political service worker[s],"'1 76 then a strong
left analysis would question not so much the nature or
skills of those who accept such a position, but instead would
challenge the academic and professional labor markets that
produce so much service work and so few ownership or
management opportunities for progressive thinkers seeking
to take the political and intellectual lead. From this
perspective, left activists' complaints that theory is an
unaffordable luxury177 could count as an intellectual
challenge, not anti-intellectualism, as evidence of a political
double bind, not individual irrationality.
2. Avoiding Theory's Political Economy. Why does
foundation-shaking left critical theory cost so much both to
do and to do without-and how can critics change that
double bind? The price of most academic or advocacy jobs
might be accepting liberal legalism (or challenging it only
from the right or from racialized, gendered, or impoverished
margins). If left anti-intellectualism comes in part from a
sense that left critique is perceived as a vocation for an
academic aristocracy, then the book's model might not be
persuasive: the six chapters by legal academics, for
example, are all contributed by tenured professors at a few
of the most elite, wealthy, and some would say conservative
173. See id. at 231.
174. Id. at 233.
175. See id. at 231.
176. Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 33.
177. See id. at 3.
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law schools (Harvard, Stanford, and Columbia-with a co-
author at UCLA). 178 All of the contributors are scholars
with senior positions at leading U.S. research
universities. 179
Though the book should not necessarily be faulted for
concentrating on non-material barriers to critical theory on
the left, its general elision of the perhaps crasser questions
of the role of money and prestige is worrisome because it
reinforces a liberal convention of awkward silence about the
political economy of legal theory. Except for right-wing
funders and activists, many prominent analyses of the
direction of recent U.S. legal theory have steered away from
examining in any depth the impact of changes in funding
sources.
For example, in a piece considering, "[w]hy did critical
legal studies disappear? Will it reappear? Why does the
Federalist Society prosper?," legal scholar Cass Sunstein
steps gingerly outside the bounds of the conventional liberal
presumption that competing legal theories rise or fall based
on their purely rational merits. 180 Although he maintains
that most legal academics generally are drawn to good ideas
and committed to truth, he argues that the neutral market
for good legal theory has slight imperfections. Governing
intellectual paradigms can become distorted through
"cascade effects"-unintentional naturalized forces such as
habit, information costs, and mass psychology-that lead
scholars to credit some theoretical views without fully
examining their merits.1 81 Sunstein notes, for example, that
both CLS and the Federalist Society gained strength in the
early 1980s not just through rational persuasion but also
through the emotional power of the organized academic
communities each built. 8 2 But in considering why many
early followers and leaders of CLS showed "little continuing
178. See id. at 435-36.
179. See id.
180. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2001).
181. Id. at 1251-52.
182. See id. at 1259-60.
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interest" once they became established academics, 183 while
the Federalist Society developed into a major producer of
laws, law professors and judges,18 4 Sunstein concludes only
that the CLS premise that "law is 'political"' was
intellectually insufficient to sustain much "illuminating
further work."1 85
This conclusion is puzzling, given the parallel success of
Law and Economics and of the Federalist Society in
criticizing and capitalizing on reducing liberal law's
principles to narrow political interests. Sunstein makes no
mention whatever of the fact that the prosperity of these
conservative schools of thought have coincided with
enormous and unprecedented direct strategic investment by
wealthy conservative activist organizations intending to
change the foundations of American jurisprudence. 186
Indeed, Sunstein happily assures us that "no one pays
directly for what academics produce" and that "little money
is usually involved" in the market for legal theory. 8 7
But Sunstein (and any scholar active in U.S. legal
academia) undoubtedly is at least generally aware of the
vast amount of money going to produce and shape legal
scholarship. The Olin Foundation's web site shows the
following grants authorized in 2003 to law schools to
promote Law and Economics: $10 million to Harvard (the
183. Id. at 1255.
184. See Amy Bach, Movin' On Up with the Federalist Society: How the
Right Rears its Young Lawyers, THE NATION, Oct. 1, 2001, at 11.
185. Sunstein, supra note 180, at 1263.
186. See, e.g., STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 127 (analyzing the
influence of conservative think tanks on the law); see also Eric M. Fink, Post-
Realism, or the Jurisprudential Logic of Late Capitalism: A Socio-Legal
Analysis of the Rise and Diffusion of Law and Economics, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 931,
948-51 (2004) (discussing how self-interested financial contributions helped
make Law and Economics a dominant legal theory); Hanson & Yosifon, supra
note 87 (attributing the success of Law and Economics to Olin Foundation
money); Richard Lippett, Note, Intellectual Honesty, Industry, and Interest
Sponsored Professorial Works, and Full Disclosure: Is the Viewpoint Earning the
Money, or is the Money Earning the Viewpoint?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1045 (2001)
(analyzing the problem of extensive conservative and corporate funding of legal
scholarship).
187. Sunstein, supra note 180, at 1253-54.
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largest foundation grant in that law school's history); $5.3
million to Yale; $1.2 million to the University of Virginia; $1
million to Stanford; $663,000 to the University of Chicago;
$600,000 to Columbia; $405,000 to George Mason; $404,500
to Cornell; $316,000 to the University of California at
Berkeley; $234,000 to the University of Southern
California; $233,000 to Georgetown University; and
$114,000 to Northwestern University.18 8 Also in 2003, Olin
listed current grants of $617,000 to the Federalist Society,
along with many other generous grants for Law and
Economics scholarship in other academic departments and
about half a million dollars for "public" interest law firms
using litigation to put Law and Economics precepts into
action.18 9 Similarly, it is no secret that the Federalist
Society has enjoyed millions of dollars of contributions from
leading right-wing activist organizations, including the
Olin, Bradley, Sarah Scaife, and Charles G. Koch
foundations. 190
Although I have not found any detailed comparison, it
seems fair to assume that CLS or other institutions or
groups promoting specifically left-leaning critical
jurisprudence have rarely received any grants remotely
approaching even the smaller of these. 191 I am not aware of
a single comparably funded research institute or center
devoted to left or progressive legal critique. Russell Sage
funding from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s helped
produce the liberal-leaning Law and Society Association,
188. John M. Olin Foundation, Inc., Schedule of Grants, http://www.
jmof.org/grantsl996.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
189. Id.
190. See PFAW, supra note 135, at 6-8.
191. The organizers of the CLS conference in its height in the early 1980s
kept the group's funds in a shoebox. Interview with Elizabeth Mensch,
Professor, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, in Amherst,
New York (Nov. 18, 2005). One notable exception to the meager or nonexistent
funding targeted at critical left theory was Martha A. Fineman's appointment
as the first Dorothea S. Clarke professor of Feminist Jurisprudence at Cornell
Law School in 1999, the only endowed law school faculty position focusing on
feminist theory. However, Fineman accepted a position at Emory Law School in
2004, and official Cornell faculty listings in early 2006 gave no indication that
the position still exists. See Cornell Law School Faculty Profiles,
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 15, 2006).
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along with a scholarly journal and several university
centers for law and society research.192 But compared to the
recent funding for conservative legal theory movements,
that period of law and society funding was far more limited
in dollars, time, and geography, and was less directly and
explicitly tied to a movement for radical political and
ideological change. 193 And after the Law and Society
movement broadened to include more non-positivist, and
more explicitly political analysis (in response to internal
criticism in the mid-1970s), it has mostly operated without
substantial external funding and without extensive
institutional connections to judges, think tanks, litigation
groups, political activists, or mass media. 194 Today, the
Russell Sage Foundation states that its funding is project-
specific and that tax law prohibits it from giving general
support to institutions. 195 While several law schools
maintain reputations for fostering progressive law and
politics, none have been backed by multi-million dollar
funding explicitly tied to increased production of wide-
ranging left jurisprudence comparable to the law schools
designed to produce conservative Christian and Law and
Economics jurisprudence.
By sharing Sunstein's striking silence about the
political economy of theory, Left Legalism/Left Critique
reinforces the conventional wisdom presenting increased
192. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL
SOCIAL SCIENCE 248-51 (1995); see also Christopher Tomlins, Framing the Field
of Law's Disciplinary Encounters: A Historical Narrative, 34 LAw & Soc'Y REV.
911, 953-55 (2000).
193. See Tomlins, supra note 192, at 958-61 (noting that the Law and
Society movement was challenged by critical legal studies scholars for failing to
address the role of political ideology); see also SCHLEGEL, supra note 192, at 251
(noting that Russell Sage's strategy was about "fostering growth in an academic
area and then moving on" and concluding that this funding overall did not
cause significant change in legal academia).
194. See Tomlins, supra note 192, at 958-61 (discussing development of the
Law and Society movement).
195. See Russell Sage Foundation, What We Do Not Fund,
http://www.russell sage.org/about/dontfund/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2006); see also
KREHELY, supra note 87, at 43 (noting that conservative foundations are much
more likely than others to "use the tax system to its full advantage" with the
goal of evading restrictions on funding political activity).
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right-wing funding as largely coincidental to any
corresponding rise of right-wing theory and policy or decline
of left theory. Judge Richard Posner, for example, dismisses
the charge that Law and Economics succeeds through
foundation money rather than intellectual merit alone,
explaining that outside funding is not necessary for salaried
academics to produce legal theory. 196 Left theory production
might, however, be affected by cost-benefit decisions about
allocating scarce time among the extensive teaching,
professional, administrative, and community duties at the
core of most non-elite law school jobs-duties that can be
relieved by employment in conservative think tanks or by
outside research grants. One would not have to adopt either
a Posnerian or Marxist faith in the overarching power of
material incentives to give some credit to the claims of the
Olin Foundation and other "investors" that they are
receiving handsome substantive policy returns on their
enormous outlay of money to support conservative legal
theory. 197
By focusing on the demise of left theory as a problem
divorced from a material, historical context, Left Legalism
tends to perpetuate a construction of theory as separate
from politics, history, and material support. As a result,
Brown and Halley's argument for theory is in many ways
liberal and uncritical, and even anti-left. They argue for
understanding left law reform choices as posing double
binds that require not just taking sides but questioning the
framework of analysis. 198 But they do not sufficiently
understand left scholarly choices as governed by double
binds that could similarly benefit from being subjected to
critique. It is not enough to simply theorize as if the wolves
are not at the door. Instead, left critique should envision,
and strategize about, how to strengthen and open the doors
196. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Comment on Lempert on Posner, 87 VA. L.
REv. 1713, 1714-15 (2001) (criticizing as "extreme" and absurd the suggestion
by Richard Lempert that conservative funding had anything to do with the
success of Law and Economics, on the ground that outside funding is "not vital
to research conducted in law schools" because of its theoretical, non-empirical
nature).
197. See supra notes 99, 188-90, and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 34-40, and accompanying text.
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that would make it possible and pleasurable for more
progressive and left scholars to think beyond the wolves
that they aim to resist.
II. LESS (LEFT) POLITICS
Left Legalism/Left Critique argues that the left needs
not just more theory, but also less instrumental politics. By
criticizing the left's practical politics, and overlooking the
right's intellectual politics, the book tends to reinforce the
(uncritical) mainstream tradition of defining good theory in
opposition to politics, particularly left politics. Most of the
chapters in Left Legalism do engage concretely, creatively,
and cogently with controversial contemporary policy issues:
gay marriage, 199  employment discrimination law,
200
reproductive rights,20 1 and international human rights
law.20 2 As a result, Left Legalism helps refute the
conventional criticism that critical legal theory is too
nihilistic and abstract to be politically relevant.
Nonetheless, much of Left Legalism tends to avoid some
of the hardest political and intellectual questions by
treating the left's dilemmas primarily as conflicts between
smart theory and simplistic politics rather than as conflicts
between competing theories or between competing political
interests (or both). Adopting Left Legalism's mischievously
skeptical spirit, how do we know that the book's asserted
eagerness to "open the door to the wolves" represents left
intellectual "courage" (as the editors hope 2° 3) rather than
uncritical or cowardly capitulation to prevailing right-wing
politics and theory?
Brown and Halley's introduction wisely warns against
immunizing left identity-based movements from intellectual
199. Butler, supra note 48, at 229-58; Warner, supra note 48, at 259-89.
200. Richard T. Ford, Beyond 'Difference" A Reluctant Critique of Legal
Identity Politics, in LEFT LEGALISMILEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 38-79;
Halley, supra note 48, at 80-104.
201. Drucilla Cornell, Dismembered Selves and Wandering Wombs, in LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 37-372.
202. See Franke, supra note 48, at 290-337.
203. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 36.
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challenge simply because these movements purport to
represent the correct (left) politics-the alleged interests of
subordinated groups-in the face of right-wing attacks.20 4
But that should be coupled with a countervailing warning
that spurning conventional left or liberal politics (or flirting
with right-wing arguments) is not sufficient proof of
politically irreverent and intellectually superior theory-
especially in a context where contempt for liberal ideas is a
quite orthodox part of politics and jurisprudence. The
challenge for left theory is how to critically engage left
politics without reinforcing the convention that privileges
distance from such politics as distinctively a-political-and
without disparaging attachment to left politics as
distinctively anti-intellectual.
A. Theory Versus Left Politic
In calling for more left thinking "as if the wolves were
not there,"20 5 Left Legalism oddly echoes the conventional
centrist jurisprudence that has so strongly opposed critical
legal theory. That conventional view, repeated in Sunstein's
commentary, faults left-leaning critical legal theory for
stripping reason down to power.20 6 In response, legal
scholar William H. Simon argues that a disturbing "fear
and loathing" of politics drives "[c]ompulsive crit-baiting"
among non-conservative legal scholars. 20 7 He argues that
among non-conservative legal academics, intellectual
excellence often has come to be measured in terms of
distance from political commitment and controversy. 208 As a
result, scholarly integrity often means setting up polarized
positions and then advocating a midpoint (or affirming each
side a little) to avoid complex and careful evaluation of the
204. See id. at 1-3 (opening the book with examples of political claims
allegedly bestowed with "sacred cows status" among left activists).
205. See id. at 36.
206. See id.; see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 263-64 (1993); Sunstein, supra note 180, at
1263.
207. Simon, supra note 4, at 175.
208. Id. at 177-78.
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best position.209 Ironically, this emphasis on moderating,
balancing, or alternating conflicting political positions
means non-conservative legal academics often value
incoherence, vagueness, and irrelevance more than
consistent, clear and well-elaborated arguments about
contemporary policy. 210
While many non-conservatives have focused on
defending principle from politics (however incoherently),
conservatives have mobilized this slippery opposition in
favor of right-wing politics. The right's success has been
built in part on reconstructing the opposition between
politics and principle as an opposition between left and
right political visions. Thanks to widely disseminated
conservative ideas, both popular wisdom and sophisticated
scholarship now readily reduce liberal principles of fairness,
democracy and equality to elitist "special interest" politics.
In this now-conventional critique, for instance, plaintiffs'
tort protections are about enriching greedy trial lawyers;
support for public education is about enriching incompetent
and overpaid unionized teachers; and fair and transparent
trade regulation is about coddling xenophobic, selfish, and
anachronistic blue collar American workers.
In contrast, non-conservative scholars and politicians
tend to uncritically take right-wing arguments about
"global competitiveness," "consumer choice," or "market
incentives" as legitimate (though contestable) public norms
rather than as cynical protection for laziness, greed, or
prejudice on the part of those who stand to personally gain
from right-wing reforms. 211 The "special interests"-and
vast investment-driving conservative policies are hardly a
secret. Nonetheless, critique that translates favorite
conservative principles like "efficiency" or "personal
209. See id.; see also Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in
Legal Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 785, 795-97 (describing and criticizing
the judicial strategies of appearing independent of ideology by "difference
splitting" or becoming "bipolar"-shifting between ideological poles).
210. See Simon, supra note 4, at 178, 181.
211. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 869 (criticizing Michael Graetz and
Jerry Mashaw for analyzing the political barriers to broader social insurance
programs as a matter of disinterested commitment to principles of "economic
productivity" and "individual responsibility").
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responsibility" into private protectionism (for instance, of
insurance company profits, white racial privilege, or legal
scholars seeking Olin money for personal advancement) is
more likely to get construed as crudely reductionistic and
deterministic, if not uncollegial or un-American.
A left critical analysis of the tensions between legal
theory and legal practice should be wary of, and interested
in, the political ends and effects of any theory/praxis divide.
Critical theorist Gayatri Spivak admonishes that every
theory is a strategy-implying the converse, that every
strategy is a theory.212 What is at stake, and for whom, in
constructing conflicting positions on policy questions like
affirmative action and sexual harassment as conflicts
between brave, sophisticated theory and naive, sentimental
"political correctness"? 2 13 Liberalism (including both its
"liberal" and "conservative" political branches) has been
built on a long and sorry history of using the oppositions of
theory versus praxis, reason versus sentiment, and
principle versus power to represent and reinforce
hierarchies of race, gender, class, sexuality, disability,
religion, and nationality. 214 Many of the chapters in Left
Legalism continue this uncritical tradition by singling out
feminist, anti-racist, gay identity, and disability law reform
movements for blame as insufficiently theorized political
orthodoxy and irrational sentiment.
212. Personal notes from International Feminist Theory course taught by
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Columbia University (1993) (on file with the
Buffalo Law Review).
213. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 3-5 (suggesting that positions
favoring rights to protection from sex harassment or to race-based affirmative
action rest on "common sense" politics while the book's challenges to such
positions represent stringent critical theory).
214. See, e.g., LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENFORCING NORMALCY: DISABILITY,
DEAFNESS, AND THE BODY 100-25 (1995) (discussing how intelligence and its
absence has been complexly identified with the bodily status of blindness and
deafness in theory and literature); see also STEVEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE
OF MAN (1996) (analyzing how the most prestigious institutions and scholars of
mainstream biological and social science have continued through the 20th
century to construct, promote, and "prove" their white supremacist theories
identifying capacity for reason with white male and often upper class status);
SPIVAK, supra note 63, at 13 (analyzing the Kantian idea of "rational man" as
grounded in an opposition to a primitive or savage status identified in terms of
race, gender, family status, and geography).
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B. Theory Versus Egalitarian Politics
A number of Left Legalism's contributors hope to put
strong progressive theory back in the drivers' seat by
especially pointing out the limitations of achieving equality
through the legal protection of "multiculturalism" or
"difference. '2 15 At the same time, many of the chapters too
often uncritically treat non-left politics and theory-
especially opposition to identity-based egalitarian law
reforms-as generally reflecting an impartial, transcendent
quest for truth, reason, and the public good.
If current barriers on the road to left justice are
produced not so much by anti-intellectualism as by anti-
egalitarianism, then the book's critique of liberal equality
ideals might strengthen rather than loosen the constraints
on left theory and politics. Rather than concentrating on the
moralistic project of dividing "bad" left politics from "good"
theory, left critique might do better to focus more on
confronting and negotiating the politics of theory. Once
again, paying attention to the "wolves at the door," the
right's success especially suggests the political value of
questioning and recasting the fundamentally political
divisions between theory and politics.
1. Theory Versus Racial Justice Politics. In a chapter
entitled Beyond "Difference" A Reluctant Critique of Legal
Identity Politics,216 Richard T. Ford criticizes liberals for
switching their vision of racial justice from racial
assimilation and integration to an "obsession" with
protecting "racial difference. ' 21 7 Ford argues, for example,
215. See Ford, supra note 200, at 38 (focusing on racial "difference"); Halley,
supra note 48, at 87-89 (criticizing "cultural feminism" for holding that women
form a distinct and morally superior culture or consciousness); Mark Kelman &
Gillian Lester, Ideology and Entitlement, in LEFT LEGALISMILEFT CRITIQUE,
supra note 3, at 158 (criticizing "left multiculturalism"); Kennedy, supra note
71, at 206-07 (blaming the disintegration of left rights rhetoric on the
proliferation of identity-based law reforms that undermined the idea of rights
as universal); Wendy Brown, Suffering the Paradoxes of Rights, in LEFT
LEGALISMJLEFr CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 422-26 (explaining that gender-
specific rights entrench gender regulation).
216. Ford, supra note 200.
217. Id. at 41-42.
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that the "diversity rationale" for race-conscious affirmative
action reinforces the anti-egalitarian idea that racialized
differences stem from an inevitable, natural culture rather
than from historically contingent racism.218  Liberal
attempts to secure legal recognition of cultural difference
risk reproducing the constraints of racial stereotypes. 219
With difference-based affirmative action, Ford explains,"only by highlighting their own distinctiveness could
minority students justify their presence in the universities
that admitted them. '220
Consistent with the book's theme of theory over
practice, Ford blames the "analytically deficient and
normatively impoverished" ideal of multiculturalism 221 on
liberals' "misguided tactical pragmatism that has become
confused with ultimate ends."222  Multiculturalism
represents the hope that a "difference-based" approach will
provide a route toward substantive equality that can partly
offset the empty formalism of the dominant colorblind"equal treatment" ideal.223 The ideal of protecting cultural
"diversity" has attracted some support from a conservative
judiciary, for example as a rationale for affirmative action
in Bakke,224 and now Grutter,225 Ford insightfully questions
these strategic advantages by showing how an emphasis on
racial "difference" perpetuates racism in specific examples
218. Id. at 46.
219. Id. at 49-51.
220. Id. at 46.
221. Id. at 44.
222. Id. at 45.
223. See id. at 42-43 (discussing the emergence of a liberal "politics of
difference").
224. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (striking
down a race-conscious admissions program designed to increase "disadvantaged
minority" students in medical school but stating that racial diversity can be one
among many admissions factors); see also Ford, supra note 200, at 45-49
(discussing the case).
225. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding race-conscious law




ranging from racial buddy films to employment
discrimination cases. 226
But politically sympathetic skeptics might well respond
that Ford's strategic calculation about the merits of
assimilation over diversity227 lacks both theoretical and
political sophistication. Ford asks why multiculturalism is
so popular, and why left alternative conceptions of racial
justice are almost nonexistent. 228 However, his chapter
ignores the extensive left scholarship and activism that has
amply detailed and debated such alternatives. Many critical
race scholars, for example, have tried to reframe the
problem of racial justice from a question of racial ontology
(essential sameness versus difference) to a question of
racial politics (historically contingent subordination). 229
This critical literature criticizes the dominant view of racial
inequality on the ground that it imagines racial inequality
primarily as a problem of improper moral reasoning or
irrational culture, thereby obscuring the conflicts over
226. Ford, supra note 200, at 38-40 (discussing a claim that an employer's
policy banning all-braided hairstyles count as illegal employment
discrimination based on race); id. at 49-52 (discussing popular culture).
227. See id. at 74-75.
228. See id. at 44.
229. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, 302-09 (Kimberle Crenshaw et
al. eds., 1995) (criticizing the liberal formalism of antidiscrimination law and
advocating instead a "realist" approach focused on detailed examination of the
context of political and legal power); see also Kimberl4 Williams Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra, at 103, 114-19 (discussing the persistence of
white supremacist norms under regimes of formal equality and analyzing
critical theories of race); Gary Peller, Race-Consciousness, in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra, at 127
(critiquing the debate about integration versus segregation and arguing that a
black nationalist perspective would have better promoted racial justice); Valdes,
Culp & Harris, supra note 9, at 2-3 (discussing critical race theory's focus on
antiessentialism); Robert Wesley, Many Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider
the Case for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429 (1998) (arguing for shifting
the debate from affirmative action to financial reparations for African
Americans as compensation for white supremacy).
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power and resources that undergird U.S. racialization. 230
Ford joins this dominant flight from a political analysis of
race by refusing to name an obvious, longstanding left
alternative to the depoliticized idea of "multiculturalism":
ending white supremacy. 231 Ford's erasure of this left
antiracist theory-and its political focus-helps him
present the problem of difference-based reforms as the left's
intellectual or moral lack, not the right's political strength.
In a contrasting example of race critique, Jean
Stefancic and Richard Delgado confront the politics of the
sameness versus difference debate by examining the
substantial flow of right-wing resources toward reframing
ideas about racial justice.232 In the 1980s and early 1990s,
right-wing activists and foundations subsidized and
marketed scholarship promoting the sometimes
contradictory (yet politically complementary) theories of
biological racial difference, multicultural "diversity" and
government "colorblindness." 233 During the same period,
right-wing funders poured substantial resources into a
campaign to misrepresent and demonize legal scholars who
rejected both colorblind and difference-based approaches in
230. See Kendall Thomas, Racial Justice: Moral or Political?, in LOOKING
BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY, 78-105; see also Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT, supra note 229, at 29-31 (arguing that prevailing
liberal law constructs race discrimination from a "perpetrator's perspective"
that looks at the moral guilt or innocence of individual discriminators rather
than at evidence of harmful subordination).
231. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (striking down a state law
criminalizing interracial marriage not on the ground of diversity but on the
ground of white supremacy).
232. See STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 127, at 33-81 (discussing
conservative political campaigns focused on promoting eugenic views of
intelligence and opposition to affirmative action).
233. See, e.g., id. at 34-81 (discussing American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
fellow Charles Murray's work attributing racial inequality to genetic
intelligence differences and AEI's campaign against affirmative action,
supported by the Olin Foundation); see also id. 73-75 (discussing the Olin
funding for the Hudson Institute's campaign to promote corporate "diversity"
instead of "affirmative action").
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favor of a more complex theoretical and political analysis of
racialized subordination. 23
4
A right-wing media campaign, for example, transformed
Lani Guinier into a difference-enforcing "quota queen,"
derailing her appointment as head of the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division, even though her vision
of voting rights presents a sophisticated alternative to both
colorblindness and essentialized racial difference. 235 Right-
wing think tanks and centrist scholars have similarly
attacked Patricia Williams as a leading proponent of racial
essentialism and separatism236 even though her work
emphasizes a postmodern vision of race that challenges
assumptions of fixed, coherent identity and difference 237
and even though she explores the limits, fluidity, and
inconsistencies of rhetoric about both multiculturalism and
integration.23
8
234. See Crenshaw, supra note 229, at 22-25 (discussing the race-baiting of
critical race theorists in legal academia and in popular media); see also Valdes,
Culp, & Harris, supra note 9, at 3-4 (discussing how racial backlash politics
targets critical race theory).
235. See Laurel Leff, The Making of a "Quota Queen," in FEMINISM, MEDIA &
THE LAw 27 (Martha A. Fineman & Martha T. McCluskey eds., 1997); see also
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG 138-49 (1995).
236. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:
THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAw 13, 20 (1997); see also
Heather MacDonald, Law School Humbug, CITY J., Autumn 1995, at 46-59
(giving Williams as an example of someone who thinks black women share a
single, unquestionable, and distinct voice); Neil A. Lewis, For Black Scholars
Wedded to the Prism of Race, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1997, at B9 (reporting
criticism of Patricia Williams' argument that the false basis for a young black
woman's charge of rape did not mean there was no crime or racial stereotyping
involved); Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Who Are We? And Why Are We
Here? Doing Critical Race Theory in Hard Times, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS,
AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 9, at xvi (discussing scholarly and
media criticism of Patricia Williams as an example of personal attacks directed
at critical race scholars).
237. See Laura Kalman, Race Matters, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1998, § 7, at 31
(reviewing PATRICIA WILLIAMS, SEEING A COLOR-BLIND FUTURE: THE PARADOX OF
RACE (1997)).
238. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 235, at 27-28 (describing the practice of
"verbal blockbusting" where both integration and multiculturalism can be taken
over by anti-egalitarian politics).
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Ford follows the right-wing bandwagon by reading the
critical race literature to magnify its racial essentialism,
239
though his somber view of the politics of assimilation and
the prevalence of racial injustice maintain a clear distance
from the dominant center/right discourse. At times, he steps
toward embracing anti-subordination in place of either
assimilation or multiculturalism, for instance by
reconstructing affirmative action as a correction to
inequality rather than as a promotion of "diversity. '240 Ford
astutely observes that racism is "Janus-faced . . . it
articulates difference with one mouth and condemns it with
another,"241 and that this double bind means that racism"cannot be effectively resisted by an approach that grabs
only one side of the pincers."
242
But Ford ultimately rejects the critical race project of
theorizing solutions to this racist double bind, instead
limiting the chapter's analysis to what he admits is the
politically ineffective project of favoring the sameness
"pincer. ' 243 Ford's intellectual caution here seems tied to his
political caution; he repeatedly backs off from analyzing
racial inequality as a problem of antagonistic interests and
ideology. Contradicting his later analysis of a "racist
discourse" producing a "double bind,"244 the chapter begins
by assuming that the competing ideals of multiculturalism
and assimilation represent an "honest disagreement about
239. See Ford, supra note 200, at 57-59 (reading Regina Austin's analysis of
a race discrimination case in a way that emphasizes its cultural essentialism
rather than its critique of cultural stereotypes).
240.vSee id. at 47-48.
241. Id. at 75. The more the idea of government colorblindness stands for
racial justice, the more the law is free to produce and punish racialized
"difference" (naturalizing that difference as a problem of genetics, culture, or
economics rather than as discrimination susceptible to state redress). See id. at
51. On the other hand, the more law reforms aim to mitigate this punishment of
racialized difference (with affirmative action or "cultural" rights, for example),
the more it constructs the production and punishment of racialized difference as
neutral or natural and the advancement of racial assimilation as suspect,
unequal legal intervention or social engineering.
242. Id. at 75.
243. Id. at 52, 75.
244. Id. at 75.
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what racial justice entails" among those unequivocally
committed to racial justice or "a partial victory of one wing
of the racial justice left. ' 245
Similarly, Ford's argument in favor of race-neutral civil
rights strategies depends on a simplistic assumption that
the right's interest in "colorblindness" reflects a coherent
and principled preference for increased racial integration
and race-neutrality. Instead, political interest in
colorblindness may reflect and reinforce a self-serving or
unreflective white supremacist "common sense" that is fully
compatible with increased racial separation and hierarchy.
For example, the popularity of "colorblindness" may be a
product of an unexamined and convenient premise that
racial justice has been largely achieved regardless of actual
racial segregation; or that whites are now the subordinated
caste; or that racial hierarchy is an inevitable and fair
reflection of "market forces" or "cultural difference." Or,
some of the support for "colorblindness" may represent a
cynical and strategic belief that taboos on overt discussion
of race will paradoxically reinforce a race consciousness
that will preserve or excuse white privilege. From this more
complex perspective, colorblindness is likely to work as a
one-way ratchet to constrain, but not expand, racial
equality24 6 -making the choice between race-neutrality and
race-consciousness a double bind, as Ford sometimes
recognizes.
At the end of the chapter, Ford hints at his reasons for
refusing to "negotiate the tightrope" of the double bind that
makes all legal strategies for racial justice risky.247
Dimming the chapter's initial hope for resolving "an honest
disagreement"248  about moral principles or strategic
calculations, he confesses that racism is inherent and
245. Id. at 43.
246. See, e.g., KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM:
PLAYING THE RACE CARD AGAINST AMERICA'S POOR 122 (2001) (discussing how
colorblind antipoverty programs in the 1960s War on Poverty nonetheless
sparked white supremacist backlash and a racialized politics of welfare).
247. See Ford, supra note 200, at 75.
248. Id. at 43.
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endemic in American society.249 But, unlike critical race
scholars who share that view,250 Ford removes that
pervasive racism from intellectual analysis, political
challenge, or legal reform by assuming that it is a cryptic,
universal force of "culture" seemingly beyond human
knowledge, agency, and interest.251 As a result, Ford's
chapter ends up seeming to embrace the cultural
essentialism it claims to critique.
Perhaps, in keeping with the general postmodern bent
of the book, Ford sees racial justice as a cultural or moral
rather than as a political problem because he resists
viewing racial domination and subordination as a systemic
pattern. But, like much of the book as a whole, the
resistance to an overdetermined structuralist vision of
political power tends to take shape as a deterministic
conservative vision that locates most inequality outside of
politics. Ford's chapter ultimately acquiesces in a common
sense that makes racial injustice not primarily a problem of
rationally exercised power, but instead a matter of
irrationally determined essential, ahistorical, pre-political
structural force variously called culture, nature, market, or
individual preference.
2. Reason Versus Disability Rights Politics. In another
chapter criticizing liberal legal protection of "difference,"
Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester challenge rights to special
education for children with learning disabilities ("LDs").252
The authors present special education rights as an example
of how "left-wing multiculturalism" 25 3  uses
antidiscrimination arguments to avoid rational debate
about the overall costs and benefits-and the morality-of
procuring educational resources for particular students at
249. Id. at 75.
250. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 5
(Adrien Wing ed., 2d ed. 1997) (listing the idea that "racism is an ordinary and
fundamental part of American society, not an aberration that can be readily
remedied by law" as an organizing principle of critical race theory).
251. See Ford, supra note 200, at 75.
252. See Kelman & Lester, supra note 215, at 134-77.
253. Id. at 136.
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the expense of others. 25 4 Again demonstrating the book's
theory-over-politics theme, they blame left-wing intellectual
deficiency, not right-wing political power, for the
shortcomings of special education as a strategy for
educational equity.
But the chapter's supposed left theory is difficult to
distinguish from uncritical right-wing politics. The authors'
analysis consists mainly of applying a simple and familiar
Law and Economics formula for constructing right-wing
policy as good reason and left-wing policy as bad politics.
Step one: construct progressive policies as problems of
"redistribution" or "equity" that pit one disadvantaged
group's interests or needs against another's. 255 Step two:
invoke neutral reason or impassioned morality to justify
hard-hearted scrutiny of these interests to determine the
group's deserved rank in a long "queue" for meager
resources. 256 Step three: let anti-progressive policies stand
unquestioned outside of that competitive queue by
constructing conservatives' underlying interests as matters
of essential and universal truth, not contingent and partial
254. See id. at 164.
255. See id. at 160-64 (critiquing the "liberal" or centrist distinction between
"discrimination" and "redistribution," but failing to critique the conservative
distinction between state-based "redistributive" gains and market-based
"productivity" gains); see also MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM Go AWAY: CLINT
EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 71
(2003) (showing that Richard Epstein's Law and Economics characterization of
disability rights as "charity" relies on the unsupported speculation that
disability discrimination laws impose more costs than benefits on society);
Martha T. McCluskey, The Politics of Economics in Welfare Reform, in
FEMINISM CONFRONTS HoMo ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW & SOCIETY 198-99
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005) [hereinafter
McCluskey, Welfare Reform] (explaining how identity politics helps construct
what protections count as "redistribution" rather than efficiency-promoting).
For a discussion of the inevitably political basis of distinctions between
"redistribution" and "efficiency," see McCluskey, supra note 41, at 786-89; see
also Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation
"Reform," 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 716-63 (1998) [hereinafter McCluskey,
Illusion].
256. See Kelman & Lester, supra note 215, at 161-64; see also MARK KELMAN
& GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT
OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1997) (expanding this argument and




politics. Voila: the right's policies conveniently come to the
front of the line as normal and natural distribution, while
the left's policies go to the rear as special and political
"re"distribution that usually must await better days, better
politics, or better proof that the recipients are truly
deserving.2
57
For Kelman and Lester, educational accommodations
for students with LDs should be analyzed as "special"
intervention at the expense of the many other potentially
deserving children patiently waiting for help in an
inevitable educational queue. 258 Progressives should keep
children with LDs in their place in the distributive line,
resisting temptation to help them "jump the queue" with
misleading claims to disability rights. 259  Implicitly,
however, the children favored by educational methods that
harm students with LDs can claim their place in line not as
an undeserved "jump" or contingent, coercive political
intervention but as a natural, and naturally deserved,
advantage.
The authors reject as disingenuous and unprincipled
the conventional liberal arguments that educational
accommodations for students with LDs will benefit society
overall through, for example, increased productivity,
improved educational effectiveness, more rational
educational standards, or reduced animus. 260 The authors
fault such arguments because, in theory, a different
progressive strategy-such as reforms directed at the
harms of economic class, not disability-might better
257. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 255, at 715-22, 914-20 (showing
how the opposition between "redistribution" and "normal" distribution rests on
arbitrary but political distinctions between essential and contingent costs and
rights).
258. See, e.g., Kelman & Lester, supra note 3, at 163 (distinguishing
between accommodations for LD students and policies based on what they
imply as a pre-political, non-redistributive idea of "pedagogic policy"); see also
id. at 151 (characterizing antidiscrimination policies as "interventions"
compared to some implicitly naturalized market distribution).
259. Id. at 164.
260. See id. at 152-61.
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address all these supposed goals. 26 l Because advocates
cannot prove disability rights are the best means to these
supposed (and supposedly nondistributive) ends, Kelman
and Lester conclude that disability rights must be
understood as a strategy for securing advantages (or
charity) for a narrow interest group.262
Opposition to disability rights from the right or center,
in contrast, needs no such empirical proof or careful logic.
The authors catalog the demands by opponents of disability
rights not as artificial or irrational "entitlements" but as
authentic, consistent, and widely shared values. They
accept at face value opponents' arguments that educational
accommodations threaten, for example, productivity,
educational effectiveness, states' rights, rational
educational standards-or even freedom and capitalism
itself.26 3 Might there be more important barriers to
American educational equity or excellence-or to the future
of American productivity-than accommodations for
children with LDs?
If so, then opposition to disability rights logically
involves not just principled concern for the general welfare
but also strategic advancement of particular political
interests that might impose less-than-perfectly-reasonable
costs on others. For instance, criticism of LD
accommodations might plausibly serve some upper class
interests, like encouraging disadvantaged groups to fight
over their place in line for educational crumbs rather than
261. Here, the authors ignore the substantial left disability scholarship and
activism that justifies disability rights by complicating, rather than invoking,
liberal principles of "productivity," "educational excellence," or lack of animus.
See, e.g., LENNARD J. DAVIS, BENDING OVER BACKWARDS: DISABILITY,
DISMODERNISM, AND OTHER DIFFICULT POSITIONS 30-31 (2002) (explaining that
productivity or functionality is a product of the political and social context, so
that providing a wheelchair for the "disabled" person is little different than
providing computers for the "normal" person); see also Martha T. McCluskey,
Rethinking Equality and Difference: Disability Discrimination in Public
Transportation, 97 YALE L.J. 863 (1988) (examining how what is discounted as
"animus" or counted as a "cost" or "benefit" is itself a product of the problematic
political and social assumptions that presume the subordinate status of persons
with disabilities).
262. See Kelman & Lester, supra note 215, at 163-64.
263. See id. at 148-53.
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uniting to demand more overall educational resources and
less queuing. 264 Or, plausibly, criticism of LD programs
might help to animate and legitimate broader opposition to
public education; 265 it might help to construct flexible,
individualized learning as a privilege restricted to those
who can afford elite private schooling; or, it might help
foster a climate of animus and disdain toward those unable
to succeed in the current political economy so that its ample
injustices are blamed on its victims' natural inferiority-
and on their unnatural "entitlements"26 6-rather than on
right-wing public policies and the elites they enrich. 267
Like much of Left Legalism, this chapter risks being not
just irreverent but irrelevant to left politics because it
avoids careful, critical analysis of these questions of
political context. Kelman and Lester assert that left
advocacy of disability rights is a politically expedient
compromise with the right that diverts attention from the"real battles against social caste 268  to a group (the
disabled) many conservatives already privilege as
particularly deserving. 269 The enactment of the Americans
with Disabilities Act proves that "[i]t is surely the case that
conservative support for programs that benefit the disabled,
264. See Kirk A. Johnson & Krista Kafer, Why More Money Will Not Solve
America's Education Crisis, 1448 HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, June
11, 2001, http://www.heritage.org. Right-wing support for special education
seems to focus on making funding for children with disabilities contingent on
funding cuts for educational services targeted to gender equity, racial
minorities, or lower-income populations. See Krista Kafer, Making Good on
Promises to Increase Funding for Special Education, 1585 HERITAGE
FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 10, 2002, http://www.heritage.org.
265. See Marie Gryphon & David Salisbury, Escaping IDEA: Freeing
Parents, Teachers and Students Through School Choice, in POLICY ANALYSIS
2002 (Cato Institute, No. 444, 2002).
266. Kelman & Lester, supra note 215, at 156.
267. See JOHNSON, supra note 255, at 68-75 (explaining the right-wing
strategy and interest in undermining antidiscrimination laws by naturalizing
the subordination of people with disabilities).
268. Kelman & Lester, supra note 215, at 164.
269. See id. at 135.
20071 1249
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
rather than other needy constituencies, has been high over
the past two decades. 2 70
Kelman and Lester do not acknowledge or respond to a
contrary, and more complex, analysis common among left-
leaning disability advocates: that conservative ideology
treats people with disabilities as particularly deserving of
segregation, private (especially religious) charity and
medical intervention, but particularly undeserving of
assimilation, government economic support, or substantive
legal rights. Journalist and activist Mary Johnson explains,
for example, that virtually no conservative, centrist or even
liberal funding goes to support activism for disability rights,
despite substantial funding for "curing" disability,
consistent with conservative views of disability as a
personal, medical issue.271 On the other hand, right-wing
foundations, think tanks, and wealthy business leaders
have put substantial resources into a campaign to turn
public, judicial, and scholarly opinion against disability
rights272 and against government disability benefits. 273 As
one prominent part of this strategy, wealthy individual and
corporate donors have directed funding to legal scholars
who deploy Law and Economics arguments against
disability rights and benefits. 274
A critique that understands theory as a product of
political economy might footnote the fact that Kelman and
Lester received Olin Foundation money for empirical
research that contributed to their work criticizing disability
270. Id. at 136.
271. JOHNSON, supra note 255, at 129-30.
272. See id. at 68-75.
273. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 847-71 (showing how both economic
and moral conservatives have promoted the restrictions on benefits for disabled
workers by constructing them as undeserving); see also MARTA RUSSELL,
BEYOND RAMPS: DISABILITY AT THE END OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 144-69 (1998)
(explaining the conservative political campaign to reduce disability benefits);
James M. Taylor, Facilitating Fraud: How SSDI Gives Benefits to the Able-
Bodied, in POLICY ANALYSIS 2000 (Cato Institute, No. 377, 2000) (advocating
restrictions in social security benefits for persons with disabilities).
274. See JOHNSON, supra note 255, at 68-70.
1250 [Vol. 54
THINKING WITH WOLVES
rights.275 More clearly relevant is the fact that the right-
wing Cato Institute has used their work to support its
arguments for replacing (or weakening) public education
with "private choice."276 Kelman and Lester may well
intend their work to inspire radical reform of the vast class
disparities in America's educational resources, and Brown
and Halley wisely argue that critical thinking should not be
held to a strict cost/benefit test of its political impact.277 But
Kelman and Lester's analysis might be more useful to left
rather than to right-wing theory and politics if it had
considered whether educational reform requires something
more than perfecting our rational (or moral) rankings of
who deserves most in a pluralist queue for increasingly
meager public resources. 278 Instead, a critical analysis of
educational equity should examine how to increase
resistance to a political double bind in which the line ahead
of the plausibly most deserving only gets longer when we
send others to the rear.
3. Theory versus Feminist Anti-Harassment Politics.
Janet Halley contributes a chapter faulting sexual
harassment doctrine for its ties to a "cultural feminism"
that is "easily offended . . . schoolmarmish, judgmental,
[and] self-righteous. ' 279 She worries that increased legal
protection for sexual harassment plaintiffs (especially in
same-sex harassment cases) will lead to sexuality
275. See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 256, at x. This is not to say that
receiving right-wing funding essentially determines the political identity of the
work, but only that the political economy of a specific theory is one part of what
critical scholars might usefully look at in analyzing the complex question of
what political and economic work a particular theory actually does.
276. See Gryphon & Salisbury, supra note 265, at 12, 23 n.99; David F.
Salisbury, Lessons from Florida: School Choice Gives Increased Opportunities to
Children with Special Needs, in BRIEFING PAPERS 2003, at 13 n.42 (Cato
Institute, No. 81, 2003).
277. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 27.
278. See Kelman & Lester, supra note 215, at 157 (asserting that the real
task of the disability advocate is to rationally persuade others of the place of
disabled children in a moral ranking of those deserving increased educational
assistance).
279. Halley, supra note 48, at 89.
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harassment. 280 If workers have more legal power to
challenge the sexual conditions of work, in theory they will
have more power to increase the costs of others' enjoyment
of sexualized workplace interactions, especially interactions
that eroticize workplace subordination and coercion.
In part, Halley's critique exemplifies how irreverent left
theory can valuably sharpen analysis of the politics of
seemingly progressive law reforms. What counts as sexual
behavior and what counts as unwanted or coerced sex will
in practice be interpreted not by neutral principles or
objective facts but in reference to problematic heterosexual,
gender, and racial norms.281 As a result, laws against
sexual harassment are likely to disproportionately penalize
gay men, lesbians, and other subordinated persons whose
sexual and economic autonomy has been subject to
suspicion. 28 2
On the other hand, subordinated groups also may have
the most to gain from legal protection against workplace
sexual harassment. Gay men, lesbians, and others have
used sexual harassment law to challenge disparate
treatment on the job due to their gender non-conformity. 28 3
Compared to their numbers in the workplace, women of
color are overrepresented as plaintiffs in sexual harassment
lawsuits. 28 4 In her analysis of this empirical evidence,
280. See id. at 99.
281. See Franke, supra note 48, at 292-93 (summarizing chapter's argument
that by reading certain assaults as sexual violations we can elide the race,
gender, or other injuries involved).
282. See Halley, supra note 48, at 98-99.
283. For example, a gay postal worker used the sexual harassment doctrine
to make a sex discrimination claim that he was disciplined unequally and
ultimately fired for failing to conform to prevailing masculine stereotypes,
Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002), and a restaurant worker
used the sexual harassment doctrine to seek redress for frequent anti-gay
insults directed at his supposed femininity, Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., 256
F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001). For a theory of how sexual harassment doctrine
can protect lesbians, gay men, and others who are penalized for gender
nonconformity, see generally Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual
Harassment?, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw 169 (2004).
284. See Tanya Katherine Hernandez, The Next Challenge in Sexual
Harassment Reform: Racial Disparity, 23 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 227, 227 (2002)
(noting that women of color made up 16% of the female work force but filed 33%
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critical race feminist Tanya Hernandez explains that some
studies suggest that women of color are particularly
disadvantaged by workplace sexual harassment due to their
vulnerability in the labor market.286 Hernandez found that
women of color were more likely than white women to rely
on litigation rather than on informal, internal complaints,
because of concerns about receiving fair treatment from
employers.28 6 Another leading critical race and feminist
scholar, Adrienne Davis, analyzes slavery as a system of
institutionalized sexual harassment and notes that, despite
serious limits in sexual harassment doctrine, black women
have also had some success in developing the doctrine to
remedy their particular problems of workplace
subordination. 28 7
The problem is that both with and without sexual
harassment protection, gay men and lesbians-like others
with subordinated status-are at heightened risk of losing
access to work on account of their (real or perceived) sex
and gender transgressions. 28 8 But Halley evades grappling
with the double bind she initially poses as the central
political and intellectual challenge for sexual harassment
doctrine. 28 9 Instead, she risks tightening the bind by
disparaging sexual harassment protections as sentimental
moralism, 290 and by implicitly contrasting her preferred
protections against sexuality harassment as tough-minded
individualism.
In part, Halley astutely refuses to appeal to some
imagined moral consensus or transcendent principle to
resolve the dilemmas of sexual harassment policy, and
of all women's sexual harassment claims under Title VII during the 1992-1999
period).
285. Tanya Katherine Hernandez, A Critical Race Feminism Empirical
Project: Sexual Harassment and the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1244-45 (2006).
286. Id. at 1255-60.
287. Adrienne D. Davis, Slavery and the Roots of Sexual Harassment Law,
in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw, supra note 283, at 457, 462-64, 470-
71.
288. Halley, supra note 48, at 81.




instead confronts the problem as an inevitably political
conflict between queer and feminist interests. 291 On the one
hand, some feminists (along with some anti-feminist
defenders of conventional femininity) prefer to enlist legal
authority on the side of reducing the costs of challenging a
workplace culture that enforces engagement with
conventionally masculinized sexuality as a condition of the
job.292 On the other hand, some queer activists (along with
some anti-feminist defenders of conventional hetero-
masculine privilege) prefer to err on the side of reducing the
costs of fostering and playing with such a sexualized
workplace culture. 293
Halley retreats from astute political analysis, however,
when she uncritically presents the feminist cultural
preference as uniquely moralistic and essentializing
("trend[ing] toward totalitarian")294 while contrasting the
queer cultural preference as uniquely liberatory. This
characterization-despite its expressed disdain for
"moralism"-shifts the discussion from a complex,
uncertain, and contestable question of politics into a
superficially clearcut and impartial moral project of
ranking good versus bad theory.
Adopting Halley's critical stand, why isn't any alleged
anxiety about harm from sexual harassment lawsuits a
problem of oversensitive, self-righteous potential
defendants?295 Maybe those at increased risk under a pro-
plaintiff legal regime really desire-or really should
desire-not more legal protection, but more opportunity to
prove themselves tough enough or honest enough to sit back
and enjoy the excitement of facing heightened danger,
complexity, and vulnerability in their workplace sexual
291. Id. at 102.
292. See id. at 93, 98.
293. See id. at 98.
294. Id. at 89.
295. See Martha T. McCluskey, Fear of Feminism: Media Stories of Feminist
Victims and Victims of Feminism on College Campuses, in FEMINISM, MEDIA &
THE LAW, supra note 235, at 61-69 (showing how gendered and racialized ideas
of "real" injury privilege the victim narratives of those claiming harm from
feminist sexual harassment policies).
[Vol. 541254
THINKING WITH WOLVES
interactions. 296 How does Halley know? It seems fair to ask,
since Halley uses a similar irreverent moral and
epistemological skepticism to deprecate as bad theory
feminist claims to know that the risks of sexual harassment
are more likely to be a source of pain than pleasure for
potential plaintiffs. 2
97
By insisting on and even reveling in (albeit
inconsistently) the impossibility of knowing and proving
who really is hurt, what really constitutes harm, and who
really has the power to inflict it,298 Halley's chapter cuts to
the heart of a major tension between left politics and some
strands of postmodern critical theory. Starting with a
premise that all claims of harmful power are suspect, and
that indeed all power is fluid, complex, and enmeshed with
powerlessness, it can then seem smarter, more fun, and
even more moral to abstain from complaining about
injustice or from advocating any clear and concrete social
change.
Left activists who are bored-or outraged-by such
celebrations of postmodern "unknowability" should not be
dismissed as unsophisticated thinkers with a fetish for
"suffer- monger [ing]. ' '299 Those who take delight in turning
claims of "real injustice" into hypothetical justice, as
Halley's chapter so provocatively does with the Oncale300
same-sex harassment case, may be using uncertainty as a
sentimental excuse for denying and evading their own
power. Any argument involves actual (if not perfectly
knowable) political and moral choices, explicitly or
implicitly. By pretending uncommitted distance from the
296. Here I am adopting (but reversing) the argument Halley makes when
she argues that a feminist position might assume it is insulting to think women
too "milquetoast" to concoct powerful fantasies of subjection. Halley, supra note
48, at 101.
297. See id. at 85, 89, 97.
298. See id. at 96.
299. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 33 (criticizing in general left
justice projects focused on protecting injured victims).
300. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (deciding




political and moral fray, the postmodern skeptic and cynic
risks joining the politically phobic centrist in a "will to
ignorance" that evades critical examination of the
normative commitments and knowledge on which they
inevitably depend.3 01 Indeed, in the current political
context, intellectuals who spurn empirical knowledge as too
uncertain and too partial may be more likely to reinforce
right-wing fundamentalism than left-wing critique.302
Critical race and feminist analysis has shown that
intellectuals' (and lawmakers') professed desire to know
often is no match for the seductiveness of not knowing-
especially when knowing might be politically threatening to
the privileges or political investments of the knowers. A
decision to analyze any given inequality or injustice as a
hypothetical rather than as a real problem demanding
investigation and evaluation of empirical context (however
contested and imperfectly knowable), is itself a political
decision as well as an intellectual strategy.
How should we decide whether workplace sexual
harassment or workplace "sexuality harassment" is the
greater harm? Are the costs to plaintiffs of bringing a
sexual harassment case likely to outweigh the benefits of
suing to assuage morning-after "panic" about enjoyment of
transgressive workplace sex? Could sexual harassment
doctrine be reframed to better protect those most
vulnerable to coercive power, both in the workplace and in
the courts? Halley refers such questions to politics,
dependent on contested judgments about uncertain
consequences. 303
301. See Simon, supra note 4, at 77 (explaining that fear of politics among
non-conservative legal scholars leads centrist scholars to seek safety by taking
positions in opposition to their declared politics, with the effect that intellectual
merit becomes measured by political incoherence).
302. See, e.g., Ron Suskind, Without a Doubt, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 17,
2004, at 44 (explaining how right-wing religious fundamentalism creates a
culture and logic in which President Bush gains moral and political standing by
demonstrating he can dispense with "inconvenient facts"). Suskind describes
how a senior aide to President Bush explained, "[w]e're an empire now, and
when we act, we create our own reality." Id. at 51.
303. Halley, supra note 48, at 102-03.
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But a critical analysis should be careful not to imagine
political debate in simple opposition to empirical or moral
truth, even if it recognizes that power always informs and
infuses all judgments of fact and value. Critically engaging
political questions about who really is hurt and who really
benefits requires moving theory from hypothetical to
imperfect empirical evidence, or more precisely, digging into
the details of the historical, legal, social, and economic
context.30 4 The hard political labor of that digging,
questioning, and deciding need not be any less-and indeed
could be much more-intellectual, pleasurable, or critical
than the playfully disingenuous passivity of disavowing
such knowing and deciding.
4. Theory Engaging the Politics of Marriage Equality.
Michael Warner's chapter, Beyond Gay Marriage, joins the
chapters by Halley, Ford, and Kelman and Lester in
analyzing the high, often hidden, costs of prominent pro-
equality law reforms. 30 5  Warner challenges liberal
arguments that same-sex marriage reforms would simply
involve an impartial deference to individual preferences,
fundamental rights, 30 6  or transcendent sentiment. 30 7
Instead, he emphasizes that gay marriage has broad social
consequences, 30 8  and that these consequences include
reinforcing or expanding the degree to which marriage is a
status that confers power and privilege on some at the
expense of others.309 In particular, Warner argues that
same-sex marriage will penalize many unmarried persons,
a result that is likely to undermine more radical visions of
sexual and economic justice.310
304. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak explains that the point of critical theory is
not to reject truth or ignore history but to examine the production of ideas about
truth. See THE SPIVAK READER, supra note 41, at 9 (reporting an interview with
Spivak).
305. Warner, supra note 48, at 259-89.
306. Id. at 266.
307. Id. at 269.
308. See id. at 268-69.
309. See id. at 260.
310. Id. at 263-66.
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In contrast to other chapters in Left Legalism, however,
Warner's critique more consistently engages the issue as a
political conflict that requires negotiating and evaluating
antagonistic interests in a particular historical context.
Unlike Kelman and Lester's chapter on educational equity,
Warner recognizes that the political impact of gay marriage
on any set of interests will be far too complex, dynamic, and
dependent on unknowable future events to be neatly
resolved by perfecting activists' rational cost/benefit
calculations or empirical data. 311 In contrast to Ford's
chapter on racial equality, Warner evaluates the merits of
an assimilationist view of equality not mainly as a general
logical or moral principle, but rather as a political strategy
that will play out in practice differently and more difficultly
than its advocates intend-particularly in the prevailing
anti-egalitarian, anti-gay political context. For instance,
Warner argues that a focus on gay marriage will not be a
step toward more radical reforms because that focus is more
likely to result in limiting the internal politics of the
activist movement itself than in integrating same-sex
couples into marriage law. 312
Unlike the chapters by Halley and Ford (and the
politically phobic centrists), Warner's chapter takes the
uncertainty, intractability, and antagonism of politics more
as the beginning than the end of rational analysis. Instead
of avoiding or disdaining moral and factual judgments
about the distribution of power and subordination, Warner
takes positions and defends them with argument and some
evidence. Warner values a "queer ethos" favoring a sexual
culture not tied to marriage, the couple form, or love. 313 He
risks knowing-instead of merely hypothesizing-that
dominant law and ideology (and gay marriage reforms) are
harmful to his preferred sexual culture.314 He asserts this
cultural value not as a neutral, apolitical reflection (or
perfection) of individual free choice or determinate
differences, but as an unabashedly political struggle for
311. Id. at 286.
312. Id. at 286-87.
313. Id. at 288.
314. See id. at 287.
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public power to foster queer normative ideals. 315 Rather
than naturalizing, romanticizing, or accommodating the
high costs of existing progressive reforms, Warner imagines
possible strategies for reframing the debate to better
alleviate such costly divisions within the pro-gay left. He
suggests, for example, that gay marriage campaigns could
do more to link marriage equality to the goal of ensuring
more equal access outside of marriage to entitlements like
health care. 316
Like many other contributions to Left Legalism (along
with non-left scholarship), however, Warner's analysis
tends to focus on resisting the political power of liberal
reformers more than on resisting their right-wing
opponents. A skeptic should wonder why so much queer
intellectual energy is concentrated on criticizing gay
marriage advocates rather than on theorizing how a queer
vision of justice could better play in Peoria or in Kansas,
3 17
or to other constituencies around the world who might gain
from resisting right-wing ideology and policy. Both liberal
gay marriage advocates and their more radical queer critics
are likely to remain largely politically irrelevant-or worse,
politically useful scapegoats for the right-unless they are
able to counter the right's power to portray both camps as
economic, racial, and cultural elites who are to blame for
most Americans' increasing insecurity.318 In contrast,
focusing on the right's power to use marriage politics to
promote inequalities that go beyond sexuality, Lisa Duggan
and Richard Kim argue for expanding gay marriage
advocacy into a left vision of household security that could
315. See id. at 277-78.
316. See id. at 278.
317. See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS? HOW
CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA (2004) (arguing that many
American voters have moved away from progressive economic policies that
would benefit them because of the right's successful, if illusory, appeals to moral
conservatism).
318. See Martha T. McCluskey, How Equality Became Elitist: The Cultural
Politics of Economics from the Court to the "Nanny Wars," 35 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1291, 1291-93 (2005) (discussing how the "cultural wars" debate mixes and
mistakes cultural and economic politics to make progressive policies seem
elitist).
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better capture shared interests among working class,
heterosexual, and queer constituencies. 319
III. LESS (LEFT) LAW
In the book's introduction, editors Brown and Halley
proclaim their desire "to scrutinize projects of the left that
invoke the liberal state's promise to make justice happen by
means of law. ' 320 Like the book's call for theory over politics,
the book's call for politics over law echoes and reinforces
prevailing themes in rightward-leaning theory and politics.
To support its argument against legalism in left practical
politics, the book should go further to theorize the practical
politics of criticizing legal protection for subordinated
groups.
In the context of early 21st century United States,
where the right has so successfully undermined progressive
politics by mobilizing opposition to "big government" and to
liberal rights, the book's anti-statism raises two questions.
First, what makes a critique of egalitarian rights and
regulation distinctly left (rather than right-wing)? Second,
what makes arguments against liberal legalism distinctly
critical (rather than fundamentalist or narrowly
instrumentalist)? Challenging the problems of liberal law
reform (without reinforcing conservative law reform)
requires examining and resisting liberalism's very division
between law and politics, as a substantial body of critical
legal analysis has suggested. 321 The book too often takes the
critical claim of law-as-politics in the direction of rejecting
law in politics rather than in the bolder and more critical
left direction of reconstructing and redirecting the politics
of dividing law from politics.
319. See Lisa Duggan & Richard Kim, Beyond Gay Marriage, THE NATION,
July 18/25, 2005, at 24.
320. Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 7.
321. See Simon, supra note 4, at 175-77 (discussing criticism of the critical
legal studies premise that law is politics). For a classic anthology of the critical
challenge to liberalism's law and politics distinction, see THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
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The book's challenge to left legalism can be roughly
captured as two arguments: first, that law is not powerful
enough; and second, that law is too powerful. Both ideas are
necessary, but not sufficient, for robust left politics and left
critique. Both arguments, after all, are central to right-wing
politics and theory.
A. Left Critique of Law's Weakness
The book's complaint about the law's lack of power
continues familiar legal realist criticisms of legal formalism
and CLS claims of law's indeterminacy. According to this
critique, law is not and cannot be independent from politics.
Law is always a product of particular, interested,
contingent power, and as such cannot achieve or even
usefully approximate the liberal ideal of a universal,
autonomous, principled, or stable constraint on power.
Law's weakness in the face of power means that
progressives cannot rely on law to shift power to
subordinated groups. The "master's tools" are unlikely to
"dismantle the [m]aster's house," says an adage commonly
invoked by critical race and feminist jurisprudence. 322 In
the book's concluding chapter examining the paradox of
rights for feminism, Wendy Brown extends a similar
warning: "[a]lthough rights may attenuate the
subordination and violation to which women are vulnerable
in a masculinist social, political, and economic regime, they
vanquish neither the regime nor its mechanisms of
reproduction."323
In their introduction to the book, Brown and Halley
complain that the left has been seduced by a hegemonic
civil rights discourse coined for (but contested within) the
mid-twentieth-century struggle for racial justice. 324 Rights,
322. Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's
House, in SISTER OUTSIDER 110 (1984) (coining the phrase); see also Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Using the Master's "Tool" to Dismantle His House: Why
Justice Clarence Thomas Makes the Case for Affirmative Action, 47 ARIZ. L. REV.
113 (2005).
323. Brown, supra note 215, at 422.
324. See id. at 8.
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they explain, "cannot be fully saturated with the aims that
animate their deployment." 325 If a legal right is sufficiently
abstract to allow it to transcend particular power relations
as a formal, universal principle, then that right's
generalized, open, and indeterminate form will invite those
with the most power to manipulate that right in their
interest, filling it with concrete substance likely to defeat
progressive goals. 326 For example, the civil right to racial
equality has been successfully captured by those defending
purported white victims of progressive racial justice
projects, such as affirmative action.3 27 "[T]he more social
resources and the less social vulnerability one brings to the
exercise of a right, the more power that exercise will reap,
whether the right at issue is sexual freedom, private
property, speech, or abortion. ' '328
Furthermore, these problems with liberal law cannot be
readily or reliably solved by taking a more contextual,
substantive, or particularized approach to legal reforms.
Brown cites the history of feminist law reforms as evidence
of the double bind presented by law's weakness: "the more
highly specified rights are as rights for women [for
example], the more likely they are to... encode a definition
of women premised on our subordination" or at least
premised on empowering only the more privileged and
powerful women. 329 Liberal law frames rights as either"universal"-thereby ignoring specific inequalities of
power-or as "special"-thereby rendering those specific
inequalities normal and their remediation suspect.330
Echoing much critical race and feminist scholarship, Brown
and Halley note that liberalism's rights framework offers "a
particularized focus on the distinctive injury suffered by a
racially subordinated group only by conceding that it is
325. Id. at 9.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. Id. at 423.
329. Id. at 422-23.
330. See id. at 16.
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special (not universal) and needs protection (not
equality)."33 1
Rights are not only likely to fall short of their
theoretical promise to stand outside of politics, but also
cannot dependably advance left goals within politics. In a
chapter developing his longstanding critique reducing
"rights" to "interests," Duncan Kennedy spells out the false
hope that liberal rights claims can represent and mobilize
universalist reason against partisan interest or moral
preference. 332 "[R]ights argument [is] indistinguishable
from the open-ended policy discourse it was supposed to let
us avoid. '333 If the left cannot win an interest battle in
policy discourse, then why should it expect to win the same
battle when translated as rights discourse? After all, the
right has proven quite capable of using liberal rights
rhetoric, such as "reverse discrimination" claims, to inscribe
conservative interests as universal neutral principles
insulated from open interested-balancing.
33 4
B. Left Critique of Law's Power
Left Legalism builds on these older challenges to law's
power by freshly and forcefully articulating the
Foucauldian-inspired position that law's powerlessness is
also an illusion of liberalism. Liberal legalism presents
procedural and rights-based law reforms as a means of
representing and protecting pre-existing individual political
subjects and political interests. But many of the
contributors to Left Legalism analyze how law is not simply
a servant doing the bidding of the political actors who use
it. Instead, law always creates and constrains the subjects
whose sovereignty and autonomy it paradoxically affirms.
Ford explains that "[1]egal entitlements in general and
especially rights do not simply protect people from outside
interference; they also channel energies and shape
331. Id.
332. See Kennedy, supra note 71, at 188-89.
333. Id. at 197.
334. See id. at 189.
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perceptions about what is important, necessary, and good in
life."335
In short, to claim new individual rights against the
state is to submit to new regulation by the state.336 Brown
explains, for example, that "[t]o have a right as a woman is
not to be free from being designated and subordinated by
gender. Rather . it reinscribes the designation as it
protects us, and thus enables our further regulation
through that designation. '" 337  Protecting women's
reproductive freedom through a right to abortion "tend[s] to
reinscribe heterosexuality as defining both what women are
and what constitutes women's vulnerability and
violability. ' 338 Similarly, advocacy for gay and lesbian rights
in childbearing and adoption law "only reaffirms the extent
to which these issues, defined as gay and lesbian issues, are
understood as separate from the project of securing women's
rights .-339
Brown rejects critical race and feminist scholars' hopes
that such constraints can be upended through an
"intersectional" approach that would understand and
protect individual rights-bearers in more complex and
specific terms (prohibiting discrimination against black
lesbian women, not just "women," for instance). 340 "[T]o
treat these various modalities of subject formation as
simply additive or even intersectional is to elide the way
subjects are brought into being through subjectifying
discourses, the way that we are not simply oppressed but
produced through these discourses .... -341 Considering
racial justice activism, Richard T. Ford explains that legal
rights to cultural difference risk becoming "a significant
new source of governmental regulation over the lives of
335. Ford, supra note 200, at 62.
336. See id. at 61, 63.
337. Brown, supra note 215, at 422.
338. Id. at 425.
339. Id.
340. See id. at 426-27.
341. Id. at 427.
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people of color. ' 342 "The individual who wishes to escape the
suffocating conformity and oppressive social norms of the
family and ethnic community will be blessed by the
intermeddling state with a 'right' to retain them forever."
343
Law enlists the state in enhancing danger not only to
intended beneficiaries of legal protections, but also to others
vulnerable to state oppression. Brown and Halley challenge
the silencing power not just of civil rights strategies, but
also of progressive procedural, institutional, or
administrative justice projects that they call "governance
legalism.'344 For instance, they argue that when "left
multiculturalists" supported the movement for Quebec
separatism, these egalitarian activists were supporting
what would have been a newly powerful subordination of
ethnic minorities (like First Nations peoples) by the
state.345
C. Right- Wing Critique of Law's Power and Powerlessness
Left Legalism invokes this anti-statism in hopes of
advancing left power independent of law at a time when the
right has successfully mobilized anti-statism to disable
progressive power in government. Right-wing activists and
intellectuals have eagerly repositioned progressive ideas
and interests well outside legitimate law and government,
while simultaneously embracing and advancing CLS-like
arguments that meaningful and legitimate power lies
beyond the state. The right-wing story, however, places this
truly legitimate non-state power in the very institutions it
describes as threatened by progressive law reforms-the
market, the family, the local community, or the church.
By reifying and romanticizing certain sociolegal
institutions as the law's outside, the right paradoxically can
justify both its powerful opposition to the liberal or left
"redistributive" and liberating state-and also its powerful
affirmation of an inegalitarian and authoritarian state. If
342. Ford, supra note 200, at 61.
343. Id. at 68.
344. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 10.
345. See id. at 10-11.
2007] 1265
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the supposedly democratic and egalitarian state generally
boils down to ineffective or oppressive special interests,
then the least oppressive, most public-interested state and
law must be that which cedes authority to supposedly
transcendent natural or supernatural forces insulated from
democratic and egalitarian control.
1. Neoliberal anti-statism. According to the libertarian
branch of right-wing politics, this transcendent force is the
free market. Neoliberalism imagines the market as a space
outside of both law and politics governed by the natural and
inevitably powerful laws of economics. 346 Set against this
imagined market, the state is both too powerless and too
powerful-especially when the state attempts to promote
progressive egalitarian goals.
Law and Economics scholars have exhaustively played
out the neoliberal theme that law reforms designed to
promote equality through rights or regulation will fall
victim to countervailing market pressures. 347 Just like CLS
lefties, the Law and Economics righties and centrists
explain that human law is too weak to constrain the forces
of supply and demand that drive the invisible, impersonal
hand of the market. In the classic example, if law promotes
equal access to housing through rent controls, then "the
market" will reflect landlords' demand for profits by
reducing the supply of well-maintained rental units.348
Legal rights-whether to housing, to racial equality, to
environmental protection, or to income support-always
boil down to political and economic interests subject to the
power of competing political and economic interests. As a
result, these "rights," even if enforced, will produce
346. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 784-85 (summarizing neoliberalism,
or "free market" economic ideology).
347. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT
TO HEALTH CARE? (1997) (using neoliberal Law and Economics arguments to
explain why rights to equality in health care will fail in their goals).
348. See Neil Duxbury, Law Markets, and Valuation, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 657,
657-58 (1995); Panel Discussion: Redistribution and Regulation of Housing, 32
EMORY L.J. 767, 793-97 (1983) (remarks by Richard Muth, Chair of the
Department of Economics, Emory University).
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"unintended consequences. ' 349 When liberal or progressive
law reforms confer new rights as protection for the weak
against countervailing powerful interests (of landlords,
employers, polluters, and so on), then those new rights will
simply create new "market" incentives for those with
countervailing interests to extract resources from the weak
in new ways. Similarly, new regulatory reforms designed to
protect groups like consumers, patients, or workers from
exploitation will simply produce incentives for their
exploiters to find new ways of evading or capturing state
control at the expense of the exploited.
Those without power, in other words, must always
"buy" their protection by making a countervailing sacrifice.
Following this reasoning, rights will inevitably translate
rather than transform existing power relationships.
Neoliberal creed proclaims that in law, as it is in the
market, the power and glory lies in some pre-determined,
transcendent "market" distribution, forever and ever, and
the best thing for the powerless to say is "amen."
Nonetheless, neoliberalism's "free market" faith reveals
law as excessively as well as insufficiently powerful. Law
and Economics scholarship is full of stories about how
liberal rights and regulation designed to advance equality
victimize the all-powerful market, undermining its
promised rewards. The conventional neoliberal dogma (like
much of the unconventional left critique) presents the
state's power as uniquely coercive, parochial, and
incompetent. Government "redistributive" action is by
neoliberal definition a deviation from a market comprised of
inherently free individual exchanges that necessarily
maximize overall societal well-being to produce the best of
all possible worlds. In this tautological logic, any state
"intervention" that upsets that free market "distribution"
will not only fail to protect the oppressed, but in fact will
349. Cass Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1390 (1994) (applying the standard Law and Economics critique




risk making that oppression worse.350 Generous welfare
benefits for the poor, for example, will hurt the poor the
worst. 351 By diverting resources from efficiency-maximizing
taxpayers and employers-and by feeding new special
interests and transaction costs produced by an expanded
bureaucracy-such social programs will shrink the overall
economic pie. 352 Those with the least market power will be
the first to suffer when there is less to go around. While
government "redistribution" sounds tempting to those who
complain of the market's harsh demands, it is always by
definition more elitist, dangerous, and anti-social than
market distribution (according to neoliberalism's
tautological reasoning).35
3
2. Neoconservative anti-statism. The social conservative
branch of right-wing politics identifies the force that
transcends law as an inegalitarian moral order rather than
in an economic order.354 That moral order is variously
located in nature, divinity, or social and cultural tradition.
Compared to this asserted extra-legal moral authority,
government attempts to promote morality through
egalitarian or liberatory law reforms will be, at the same
time, too powerless and too powerful.
350. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 255, at 716-17, 717 nn.243-44
(summarizing arguments and examples, but criticizing this reasoning as
circular).
351. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 805-06 (analyzing this argument as
the neoliberal double bind, produced by a tautological definition of economic
growth which makes "redistribution" necessary but impossible for those
disadvantaged in a presumed market).
352. See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, The Reality of Redistribution, in POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REDISTRIBUTION 127, 127-31 (Jon Neill
ed., 1997).
353. See Martha T. McCluskey, Deconstructing the State-Market Divide: The
Rhetoric of Regulation from Workers' Compensation to the World Trade
Organization, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS, supra note 255, at
147, 170 (explaining why feminist or progressive arguments for "redistribution"
will fail without challenging the division between state and market); see also
McCluskey, supra note 41, at 808-22 (critiquing that argument as resting on a
double standard).
354. See PETER STEINFELS, THE NEOCONSERVATIVES: THE MEN WHO ARE




Because moral conservatives tend to be eager to use
state authority to enforce this moral order, they may appear
to stand far from the Crits and Free Marketeers who
emphasize law's powerlessness to achieve the good society.
On closer examination, however, the theme of (human)
law's weakness against immoral power is central to the
ideology of the moralistic right. Conservatism has
frequently argued that the problem with social liberalism is
its naive hope that government can make people good and
human power benign. Social conservatives have tended to
assume most human beings are inherently weak and
imperfect and to portray the masses as fundamentally
irrational, sinful, selfish, violent or unequal (or all of the
above). This assumption drives the frequent conservative
arguments about the failures of "social engineering" by
bleeding-heart liberals who deny or ignore these harsh
facts.
Social conservative positions often present law's
powerlessness with the same anti-statist cynicism as
economic libertarians and as left or postmodern Crits.
Consider some familiar conservative arguments: welfare
rights failed to cure poverty because poor single mothers
(and their children) needed not legal power, but moral
discipline; 355 school desegregation failed to promote racial
integration because disadvantaged minorities needed
cultural change not laws mandating racial balance;35 6 sex
discrimination law failed to advance women's interests
because women wanted spiritual fulfillment or familial
protection, not worldly equality. 357
For social conservatives, however, fundamental faith in
an inegalitarian extra-legal moral order reveals the law as
not only impotent to re-order society but also as a source of
dangerous power to foster social disorder. Like left Crits
and market libertarians, social conservatives challenge the
355. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 825-32 (explaining and critiquing
social conservative arguments for welfare reform).
356. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND CULTURE: A WORLD VIEW (1994);
SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN
AMERICA (1991).
357. See, e.g., Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,
Oct. 26, 2003, at 42.
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liberal presumption that rights-based or regulatory reforms
can be fashioned neutrally to facilitate individual moral
choices without disturbing the social order that shapes
those choices. The social conservative opposition to same-
sex marriage, for example, emphasizes that gay and lesbian
marriage rights threaten profound disruption of
heterosexual families. These conservatives fear (and
radicals hope) that marriage equality could be a grand
"social experiment" capable of disrupting gender and sexual
conventions fundamental to the existing family and
civilization. Fears (or hopes) of widespread shifts in
behavior and culture due to marriage rights (or due to
welfare rights, or tort rights, or in previous generations,
racial desegregation) often draw on liberalism's naive faith
that isolated law reforms can readily vanquish
countervailing social pressures.
Nonetheless, social conservatives-like postmodern
critics and libertarian economists-recognize and reject
liberalism's naive faith that the consequences of isolated
law reforms are limited to their intended and immediate
goals. 358 These diverse perspectives, for example, are
skeptical of the liberal argument that those opposed to gay
marriage can rest assured they need not have one. The
persisting uneasiness that fuels the movement against gay
marriage probably reflects not just heterosexual
supremacists' will to overpower those with different
morality, but also a widespread fear that legal neutrality
will instead overpower a moral virtue dependent on
authoritarian and inegalitarian control of individual desire.
D. Left Critique of Law's Outside
In contrast to the left, however, the right's ideological
anti-statism appears to have led to scholarly, political, and
financial enthusiasm for achieving these goals through
legalistic reforms and state power. Though Left Legalism
complains that law's ties to liberalism risk diverting left
358. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 23 (criticizing the liberal rationale




politics toward more centrist liberal reforms,359 the right
seems to be successfully mobilizing law to undermine those
centrist liberal policies. Indeed, the right's successful law
reform campaign seems not only to further marginalize left-
of-center politics but also to threaten replacing legal
liberalism with legal authoritarianism to some extent.
The right can both use and undermine legal liberalism
so effectively because liberalism rests on not just a
fundamental faith in law, but on a fundamental faith in
some transcendent, pre-political space outside law
(variously represented, for example, as the family, the
market, nature, or the individual autonomous subject).36 0
The problem with legal liberalism, then, is not just that
liberal law falsely privileges some state support for partisan
interests by masking that support as public law that
transcends private power. Instead, the problem with legal
liberalism, from a critical perspective, is that liberal law
also falsely privileges some partisan interests by masking
these as private power that transcends public law. Feminist
critical theory in particular has analyzed how the liberal
ideology of "privacy" has served to strengthen public legal
protection of gender status-for example, by masking
systemic state protection of male family violence or male
family economic control as legal "non-intervention. ' 361
By presenting its inegalitarian, anti-democratic legal
vision as an essentialized economic or moral order outside
the law, the right has effectively rejected liberal law and
captured it as well. Neoliberalism justifies new rights and
regulations favoring elites as a move away from "liberal"
government toward superior market mechanisms; 362
359. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 24.
360. For an example of feminist theory explaining this point, see generally
ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM 3 (1981)
(explaining the problems of liberalism for feminism, since that liberalism has
positioned women outside the liberal subject); see also FINEMAN, supra note 44
(critiquing liberalism's fundamental separation of state, market, and family).
361. See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983) (critiquing the idea of
state "intervention" in the family).
362. See Martha McCluskey, Rhetoric of Risk and the Redistribution of
Social Insurance, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE
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neoconservatism justifies new rights and regulations
favoring elites as a move away from liberal government
toward superior morality grounded in community, nature,
or divinity. 363 Despite their challenges to liberal faith in
law, many of Left Legalism's essays tend to retain a liberal
(and even illiberal) faith in some space free from law that
promises (first) the strength of a more authentic power and
(second) the innocence of a more authentic powerlessness.
1. Adding a Left Critique of Extra-legal Power. First,
Left Legalism needs to go further to strip law's outside of its
guise of essentialized power. Although political power
cannot be neatly contained by formal rules of law, that
political power is also constituted, maintained, and changed
by formal rules of law. That means that eschewing legalism
is as illusory a route to power as embracing legalism.
Take, for example, Brown and Halley's assertion that
anti-pornography activism involving picketing and debating
have been more complex, democratic, liberating, and
transgressive than activism advocating new tort rights or
zoning regulations. But if picketing and debating had
superior strategic power for feminism in a particular
historical context, why do Brown and Halley conclude that
this power stems from politics more than from law? They
describe feminist power as "raw,"364 "rich,"365 and "fertile"3 66
when exercised outside law, but conclude that this power
became artificially "narrow[ ]," "flat," and "impoverished 367
when it took a "legalistic turn. ' 368 They explain that the tort
and zoning strategies "dessicated" the feminist anti-
AND RESPONSIBILITY 146 (Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) (arguing
that the late 20th century brought not a decline of social insurance, but a shift
in government security toward the most wealthy).
363. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 825-32, 858-63 (criticizing
communitarian moral conservatism for advocating different morality, based on
renewed race, gender, and class hierarchy, not for replacing liberal neutrality
with moral authority).
364. Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 22.
365. Id. at 23.
366. Id. at 21.
367. Id. at 22.
368. Id. at 21.
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pornography movement because this "legalistic moment"369
confined feminist explorations of gender and sexuality
within the established liberal framework of "free speech,
censorship, and privacy rights."370
They do not, however, consider that the alleged superior
freedom, diversity, and vitality of the feminist debating and
picketing strategies might have resulted as much from the
imperfect liberal rights and regulation they criticize as from
the gutsy anti-legalism they imagine. After all, the streets,
schools, and media in which the purported "porn wars" took
place were hardly virgin territories unengaged with law,
despite neoliberal or neoconservative pretensions to the
purity of the market or civil society. The same first
amendment framework that constrained the debate over
anti-pornography ordinances might well have helped
produce and enrich the academic conferences, publications,
and protests that Brown and Halley celebrate. When Brown
and Halley portray feminist advocates of anti-pornography
ordinances as "the legalists" who "brought into play local
governments and judges as authoritative decision
makers," 371 they erase the comprehensive legal authority
exercised by judges, university administrators, and federal
regulators, among others, which likely undergirded and
nourished the "raw" exchanges of feminist power and ideas
possible in the 1980s.
Indeed, the apparent power of left "politics" over rights
and regulation often fades as rights and regulations
change-especially, in recent history, as right-wing
legalism changes the background (and foreground) rights
and regulation of the supposedly extra-legal market and
civil society. For example, the earlier era of raucous
feminist pornography debates that Brown and Halley recall
may have been flattened not so much by the relatively
marginal anti-pornography ordinances but by successful
right-wing efforts to capture regulatory control of
educational and media institutions. Lisa Duggan relates the
story of a 1997 conference on sexuality, which included





workshops on safe lesbian sadomasochist sex, sex toys for
women, and queer sexuality, sponsored by the women's
studies department of the State University of New York
(SUNY) at New Paltz.37 2 In contrast to similar events in
universities in the 1980s, this conference appeared to do
less to enrich queer and feminist sexual politics and more to
fuel a broad right-wing law-reform movement. 373
Conservative government officials publicized selective
details of the conference to conservative commentators in
national media, and also attempted to fire the university
president and to harass women's studies and performing
arts faculty-using freedom of information requests, for
instance, to scrutinize and publicize their teaching
materials. 374 Duggan explains how right-wing government
officials and business leaders encouraged this "sex panic" as
part of a broad strategy-both political and legalistic-to
dampen left and feminist debate by centralizing and
strengthening state and corporate control over public
universities. 375
More generally, Left Legalism's examples of the failures
of liberal law reforms may be evidence of the weakness of
left politics as much as the weakness of left legalism. The
equal treatment/special treatment dilemma that confronts
feminist and anti-racist law reforms, for example, is not a
natural (or supernatural) feature of equality law but
instead is the product of a particular political strategy
addressing inequality as a problem of individual irrational
prejudice against "difference" rather than a problem of
systemic subordination that produces, institutionalizes, and
rationalizes certain "differences" as really and reasonably
inferior. 376 Outside the United States, in some countries
where equality movements-and legal scholars-have more
widely adopted a left-leaning analysis of structural
subordination, equality law has gone further to incorporate
372. See LISA DUGGAN, TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY? NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL
POLITICS AND THE ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 23-24 (2003).
373. See id. at 22-35.
374. See id. at 24-29.
375. Id. at 31-42.
376. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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a disparate impact standard that can require the
government to question and change this production and
rationalization of difference. 377 An impact-based equality
rule can require the government to respond to "differences"
of race, gender, and disability (for instance) not as "special"
needs of a particular identity group but as normal and
equal public benefits.37
8
Indeed, anti-legalism among non-conservative legal
scholars may reflect and reinforce not gutsy left politics but
left political cowardice (or capitulation to right politics)
given a political context in which advocating left law is less
likely to be rewarded than challenging left law.379 It seems
likely that non-conservative scholars will do more to
advance right rather than left politics if, for example, they
attribute liberal law's inadequacies in promoting racial
justice to legalism in general rather than to particular legal
rules (and particular political movements) that presume
and protect white privilege. 380
377. See, e.g., Joseph M. Pellicciotti, The Constitutional Guarantee of Equal
Protection in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Analysis of the
Standards for Determining the Validity of Government Action, 5 TULSA J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 1 (1998) (advocating that the United States adopt an approach closer
to Canada's equality doctrine).
378. See, e.g., McCluskey, supra note 43, at 878-80 (explaining the
advantages of a disparate impact model in the context of disability
discrimination).
379. See supra notes 99, 127, 141-43, 150, 188-89, 197, 266-67, 275 and
accompanying text (discussing Olin funding of law schools).
380. For examples of critical scholarship that rejects liberal legalism not as
a problem of "law" in itself, but as a problem of the politics of law, which
specifically wrestles with how doctrine could be made more progressive, see
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Affirmative Action,
Sodomy, and Supreme Court Policies, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2005) [hereinafter
Hutchinson, Majoritarian] (offering a "sober" reading of recent "liberal"
constitutional rulings on sodomy and affirmative action as determined by
centrist and conservative politics but exploring the strategic use of law for more
progressive ends); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds
Other than Race The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal
Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615 [hereinafter Hutchinson,
Unexplainable] (analyzing how equality doctrine has developed to give special
judicial protection to historically privileged groups and suggesting how this
could be changed into an anti-subordination vision of equality).
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Finally, in amplifying the longstanding CLS (and
neoliberal) argument that legal rights do not trump political
interests, Left Legalism risks naturalizing political
interests as somehow more independent, authentic, and
determinate than legal rights. A critical left analysis should
understand that those interests are not fixed, but are
dynamically shaped by a variety of social and political
factors including the law. From a critical perspective,
judging the social and political impact of those interests is
every bit as convoluted, unpredictable, and ideological as
judging the impact of legal rights.
Kelman and Lester, for example, mythologize-and
depoliticize-the process of formulating and contesting
political interests when they complain that "left
multiculturalist[s]" threaten irrational and chaotic
distributive politics by replacing careful measurement and
balancing of "genuine" costs and benefits with ideological
claims to "rights" based on disablity status.381  A
Foucauldian insight that rights produce as well as reflect-
or mask-interests and identities challenges not just the
natural superiority and authenticity of legalistic rights but
also the natural superiority and authenticity of political
interests. In contrast to Kelman and Lester's analysis, for
instance, sociolegal scholars David Engel and Frank
Munger show the rich interdependence of legal rights,
personal identity, and political interests in their study of
persons negotiating identities as learning disabled. 38 2 Engel
and Munger conclude that even when formal rights-based
claims are rarely invoked or weakly enforced, a liberal civil
rights framework can serve to dramatically and
meaningfully reconstruct ideas about individual capabilities
and interests. 383
381. Kelman & Lester, supra note 215, at 163.
382. DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND
IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003) (studying
the impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act on individuals with
disabilities based on interviews eliciting life story narratives).
383. Id. at 177-204 (discussing the differing and changing effects of legal
rights on different individuals' sense of their interests and identities over time
in response to changing social circumstances).
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Left law reform advocates, like those on the right, have
often effectively used rights-based advocacy to change
political interests and identification in circumstances where
their political strength is insufficient to meaningfully
secure or enforce those legal rights. For example, Martha
Davis describes how welfare rights advocates have used
international human rights claims to inspire, inform, and
mobilize new political activism and coalitions even while
recognizing that international law will have little or no
binding impact on U.S. welfare policy in the near future.
38 4
Similarly, right-wing campaigns against abortion, welfare,
affirmative action, or gay rights, for example, may often be
directed less at changing specific laws on these "cultural"
issues and more at reshaping politics so that many working
and middle class Americans sacrifice their economic
interests (whether willingly or unwittingly) out of hopes or
fears that more symbolic forms of status will offer better
security.3 85
2. Adding a Left Critique of Extra-Legal Innocence.
Second, Left Legalism needs to go further to strip law's
outside of its guise of essentialized innocence. Both left and
right critics are right that law's power cannot be neatly
contained by formal rules of law (liberal law reforms have
unintended consequences that may be harmful and
illiberal). But the same is true of any supposedly non-legal
exercise of power, regardless of any assumed connection to
market, divinity, social tradition, or radical transgression of
any of the foregoing. That means that eschewing legalism is
as illusory a route to moral (or anti-moralist) purity as
embracing legalism.
Left Legalism tends to drift from its critical recognition
that all law involves potentially dangerous power toward a
wistful desire for liberalism's neutrality. The contributors
384. Martha F. Davis, International Human Rights from the Ground Up:
The Potential for Subnational, Human Rights-Based Reproductive Health
Advocacy in the United States, in WHERE HUMAN RIGHTS BEGIN: HEALTH,
SEXUALITY, AND WOMEN IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 235 (Wendy Chavkin & Ellen
Chester eds., 2005).
385. See FRANK, supra note 317 (arguing how right-wing political strategies
offer the illusion of moral conservativism to persuade non-wealthy voters to
support economic policies that enrich the wealthy at their expense).
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often seem seduced by the neoliberal fantasy that an
unregulated space of free, independent, and authentic
individual subjectivity awaits those who reject liberal
rights.38 6 When Halley criticizes feminist law reforms for
engaging in moral regulation, she admits that this
complaint "makes one sound like a libertarian. '38 7
Similarly, when Ford criticizes left and liberal "cultural
rights" for exercising moral and political power, he tends to
avoid the harder questions of which moral and political
power is most justified. For example, he rejects a
construction of racial equality that would include a right of
workers to wear braided hair out of fear that such a right
would constrain individuals' ability to define their own
cultural identity. 388  "Private institutions, in marked
contrast to the state, with a very few exceptions, do not
even attempt to provide such authoritative censorship and
approval. When and if they do, they usually are met with
equally legitimate competitors who censor and approve of
different things."38 9
From a critical perspective, state power and legal rights
pervade these supposedly "private" institutions. And from a
left perspective, the supposedly "private" spheres of
workplace, church, family, plantation, housing market,
health care system, and mass media-for just a few
examples-historically have been deeply enmeshed in,
constrained by, and productive of the same historical
inequalities and coercive powers that pervade the state. If
courts deny cultural rights to black workers who choose to
wear cornrows, to consider Ford's example, they will likely
recognize and enforce not individual freedom to define
identity, but employers' rights, for example, to fire a white
woman whose make-up is deemed insufficiently "feminine,"
or to fire a black woman whose un-straightened hair is
deemed insufficiently "professional." And without
unblinking faith in a fundamentally fair market, it seems
386. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 794-95 n.45 (comparing and
criticizing both neoliberal and postmodern criticisms of rights).
387. Halley, supra note 48, at 89.
388. See Ford, supra note 200, at 38-40.
389. Id. at 64.
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unlikely that those "unfeminine" and "unprofessional"
women will readily find an equal number of similarly
rewarding jobs where employers are equally eager to
reward their particular gender and race expressions and to
penalize others for instance, white men without make-up or
white men who don't alter their naturally straight, balding,
or graying hair.
Taking seriously the capacity of legal rights to produce
as well as to protect individuals and their interests, left
activism and intellectualism should have all the more
reason to engage, rather than cede, rights-based law
reform. Wendy Brown's chapter on rights affirms the
paradoxical necessity and danger of feminist rights, but
then tends to imagine that the productive capacity of rights
will necessarily threaten left ideals.390 Why does Brown see
a problem, rather than a possibility, when she observes that
left visions of rights based on intersecting identities will
bring into being new political subjects?39 1 When welfare
mothers, for instance, seize on human rights discourse to
build legitimacy as political actors participating in a global
quest for political, racial, gender, and economic justice,
their new identity-however risky and regulatory-might
still well be a welcome change from the regulatory impact of
an anti-rights identity as needy or greedy societal
dependents, sexual deviants, or market failures.
Finally, when Brown and Halley criticize "governance
legalism" for implicating left politics in potentially coercive
power, they seem to refuse left power as much as left
statism. Commenting on the example of AIDS activists who
sought participation in Food and Drug Administration
procedures, they argue that, "[t]his kind of left legalism
seeks to involve the left directly in governance: once you
win, you are the state."392 They are right to warn that any
particular left regulatory effort should be scrutinized for
anti-left impact, and that in a society of systematic
390. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 7 (acknowledging that "identities
are double-edged" and can be "crucial sites of cultural belonging and political
mobilization").
391. See Brown, supra note 48, at 426-27.
392. Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 10.
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subordination, few regulatory reforms will be free of
political constraints that make liberation for some
contingent on oppression of other subordinated groups. Yet
they ignore that the same problematic effects equally
challenge any left abstention from (or resistance to) state
governance, unless we fall back on fundamentalist faith in
an autonomous private sphere inherently and naturally
safe from oppressive power (as do right-wing market or
moral fundamentalists).
From a critical perspective that refuses such
fundamentalism, the hard and urgent question is not
whether or not to be "the state," but which state structures,
governed in whose interests, we (and others) will have the
risk and responsibility of being part of and being subjected
to. Guerrilla theater by Act-Up activists may feel more
liberating, transgressive, and comfortable to some U.S.
activists and scholars than tedious, marginalized, and
morally messy involvement in federal bureaucracy. But
those feelings provide no guarantee of left moral superiority
or political effectiveness in a time when pharmaceutical
companies and right-wing Christians are happy to seize
state authority to advance their interests at the expense of
millions of lives. 393 As the "stupidest housemaid" concludes
in Paul Butler's rewriting of the classic jurisprudential
story of the Spelunkian Explorer, surrendering the power to
invoke the rule of law is even stupider and more pitiful
than believing in the rule of law. 394
IV. LESS (LEFT) IDENTITY
Much of Left Legalism finds left identity politics
particularly guilty of its charges of too little theory, too
much practical politics, and too much legalism. Anti-
subordination movements focusing on race, gender,
disability, and sexuality tend to be emotional and dogmatic,
expedient and naive, controlling and ineffective, and just
393. See Lauren Berlant, The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy, and
Politics, in LEFT LEGALIsMILEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 3, at 105, 105-33 (arguing
that a critical approach to law and politics must reject sentimentalism).
394. See Paul Butler, The Case of the Spelunkian Explorers: Revisited, 112
HARv. L. REV. 1876, 1917, 1923 (1999).
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plain no fun, a number of the contributors suggest. To
escape the left's binds, Left Legalism often seems to demand
not just more left theory and less liberal law but a different
left politics: one that eschews faith in shared culture,
sentiment, morality, or suffering, and instead strips left
demands down to raw assertions of power, economic
interests, and pleasure. 395
But once again, how do we know that the book's
complaints about identity politics are smart attacks on
"sacred cow[s] 13 96 rather than politically expedient beatings
of dead horses? The right has feasted on identity politics,
fueling its growing muscle through highly publicized
attacks on the moral or cultural assumptions driving school
integration, affirmative action, gay marriage, abortion,
gender equality, and sexual harassment protection. Once
again, Left Legalism leaves unexamined the question this
political context raises: what might make a challenge to left
or liberal identity politics distinctly critical and distinctly
left, when right-wing fundamentalists (both market and
moral) have staked out this territory so well?
Identity (based on statuses of gender, sex, race, nation,
religion, and class) has traditionally defined what counts as
the legitimate, rational exercise of power over others.
Athenian self-government, part of the foundation of
Western political theory, was defined through dominion by
the propertied male head of household over others
(children, wife, slaves, non-human property) who had no
political rights. 397 This ancient linkage between the power
to rule rationally and status in a gendered, racialized,
sexualized, propertied hierarchical order has continued to
shape modern and perhaps even postmodern ideas about
the proper scope of political liberty and governmental
395. See Berlant, supra note 393, at 126-28 (arguing that left visions of
justice should not be grounded in the reparation of pain); Brown & Halley,
supra note 3, at 32-33 (advocating pleasure rather than suffering as the focus of
left theory); Kennedy, supra note 71, at 181 (criticizing the left's turn from
economic politics to "identity" and rights).
396. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 3.
397. See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 5-6 (2005).
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authority. 398 Within such a framework, the left will not
escape the charges (from right or left) of illegitimate and
irrational political power by doing less identity politics, but
only by undoing liberalism's "common sense" presumptions
making identity the (often incoherent and conflicting)
measure of legitimate political power.
A. The Identity Politics of Critical Theory
In an opening salvo challenging "silenc[ing]" 399 by left
activists, the editors position Left Legalism as an effort to
seize power from left identity politics in particular. 400 Their
examples of left "censorship" include activists' arguments
that the particular law reform being critiqued is necessary
for the dignity, safety, or survival of a particular
subordinated group; or that critical theory is the elitist
indulgence of tenured "radicals" without authority to speak
for a particular subordinated identity group; or that certain
identity-based strategies of the anti-subordination
movement cannot be questioned without giving "aid and
comfort to 'the right."' 40 1 By dismissing these identity-based
concerns as annoying attempts to "slow down our
thinking,"402 the editors claim to re-establish authority for
left politics in independent and critical (though politically
committed) rationality rather than in simplistic
presumptions of identity, culture, or injury.
1. Whose Power Counts as Rational? But what power,
premises, and prejudices animate the book's refusal to take
their critics' arguments from identity seriously-and
delightfully-as fresh intellectual challenges capable of
moving left politics forward? Why disdain these identity-
based arguments as insubordinate irrationality rather than
credit and engage them with rigorous investigation? The
arguments the editors reject boil down to two central
398. See id. at 44 (discussing the persistence of this view as the "police
power" in modern Anglo-American jurisprudence).
399. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 29.
400. See id. at 2-3 (describing examples).
401. Id.
402. Id. at 2.
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questions: "What right do you have to speak for us?" and
"what political power do you advance when you speak
against us?" Interpreted generously, both of these questions
have potential to boldly expand the scope of critical theory
by piercing the traditional veil that dresses up good theory
as pure reason holding power in chaste abeyance.
The editors instead offer a smug answer to these
questions: we have no right and no inviolable political
agenda-we have a critique!40 3 This response asserts an
authority to speak that depends not on coercive human law,
popular political dictates, or essentialized identity or
culture, but on cool, clever detachment from the political
positions that commonly seduce the left. "We have . . . no
set of included and excluded objects, no party line about the
right level of risk to be run with legalism, no correct or
valorized audience." 40 4 The editors defend their refusal to
give in to conventional and unexamined commitments as a
stand that is not just negative, but pleasurable and
constructive. 405
But the temptations of irrational power (like sex) may
thrive on professions of abstinence, and on slippery
definitions of what counts as the impure act one is
abstaining from-and on slippery reasoning about who
counts as presumptively impure. As feminist and
postcolonial critical scholarship has analyzed, the tradition
of European critique that Left Legalism celebrates 40 6 itself
has at its core an act of inevitably extra-rational
identification that categorizes some as the subjects of
reasoning and some as the objects. 40 7 Brown and Halley
endorse Heidegger's formulation of critique as "a separation
and lifting out of the special, the uncommon, and . . . a
403. Id. at 1 (relating how a colleague dismissed an identity-based challenge
to her right to speak about Islamic woman by saying "I have no right-I have a
critique!").
404. Id. at 35-36.
405. See id. at 25-33.
406. Id. at 25-26.




rejection of the commonplace and unsuitable."408  As
Heidegger's pro-Nazi politics suggests, such understandings
of critique's mission fit especially well with uncritical right-
wing stories about identities of race, gender, geography,
nation, disability, and sexuality.409 Heidegger's project of
elevating pure reason over a fearsome, contaminating, and
irrationally powerful "Other" resembles and revives not just
the rationalism of ancient Athenian jurisprudence, as
Brown and Halley identify it.410 Instead, as Maria Grahn-
Farley explains, Heidegger's project resembles the pre-
modern rural Germanic folk tales featuring the struggles of
pure young men to stand firm against the irrational
seductions of semi-human essences which would tempt
those men to forsake their superior humanity. 411 Such
traditional superstitions would appear to be the opposite of
Brown and Halley's model of critical theory.
The paradox of critique is that its missionary project of
replacing "common sense" with reason inevitably must
build reason through common sense. The heart of the
problem is that any critique must distinguish which
arguments, which speakers, and which factual narratives
merit attention and authority as relevant and rational-
and which arguments, speakers, and stories get ignored,
dismissed, or constrained as irrational power, irrelevant
indulgence, or primitive sentiment. Due to inevitable limits
on time, space, and information, those distinctions fall back
on common sense, habit, and institutional custom-much of
which (like the Germanic folk tales echoed in Heidegger)
has been saturated with essentialist ideas and practices of
race, gender, and sexual (and other) subordination.
408. Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 25.
409. See Maria Grahn-Farley, The Ideology of Genus & the Ghost of
Heidegger, BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 n.2 (2004).
410. See id. at 25 (tracing critique's origins).
411. See id. at 4-5. Maria Grahn-Farley explains that Heidegger's contrast
between Wesen and Dasein-spiritual "essences" and the "human"-tracks
common folk tales about corrupting "Wesen," like leprechauns, elves, trolls and
other spirits. Grahn-Farley notes that the folktales typically portray the
humans corrupted by these non-human essences as young heterosexual males,
and the dangerous essences appearing as females. See id. at 4-5 n.5.
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A more carefully theorized response to the complaints
from left activists would acknowledge that Left Legalism,
like any practice of theorizing, does not only have a critique,
it also has rights and other forms of power. Any critical
theory inevitably must be supported by a ground of coercion
and convention typically protected from rigorous rational
scrutiny. Very concretely, the editors and contributors of
Left Legalism have the legal right and the socioeconomic
power to be published and to publish, to speak and to
selectively listen, read, and cite-and to be selected for
listening, reading, and citation by audiences privileged with
legal and socioeconomical power to shape law, scholarship,
and policy. The speakers in Left Legalism have substantial
power, for instance, as editors and authors, teachers,
tenured professors, conference organizers, and as owners
and consumers of substantial financial, property, and social
resources, to exclude or include many persons and ideas
from participation in theoretical debates.
Some who walk into, for instance, a Harvard Law
School classroom or conference room hoping to make bold
arguments challenging the premises of U.S. law can expect
to be arrested, not critiqued (thanks to property rights,
backed by state violence, taking priority over free speech
rights). Some will be free to enter and listen, but will not be
invited to speak, and some who speak will not receive much
attention or engagement. Many others will not get in or
even near the doors of the powerful institutions that open
ideas to substantial circulation and discussion. Access to
those doors, and power to command an audience within
them, depends in part on access to particular attributes of
citizenship, money, language, politics, culture, and on
status in the U.S. academic or professional hierarchy. It is
neither irrational nor trivial to seek to question how the
distribution of socioeconomic power and legal rights to
theoretical exchange might reflect and advance the
problematic status hierarchies of right-wing identity
politics as much as the pure pursuit of critical reason.
This problem does not mean that critical theory is
essentially non-left, non-rational, or immoral, but only that
a critical project of bold rationality should strive to subject
its inevitable ground of power and common sense to
continual critical scrutiny. Turning such scrutiny on Left
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Legalism, this volume often excludes without explanation
much of the large body of left critique that places the
politics of race, gender, empire, geography, and disability
(among other status categories) at the center of rigorous,
anti-foundationalist theorizing.
For example, the editors' introduction situates critique
in the European scholarly tradition of Kant, Hegel, Marx,
Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida, 412 without mentioning
(favorably or not) other enormously influential non-
European-identified framers of left critical theory like
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak or Edward Said (both of whom
center questions of race, nation, and geography in their
critiques). Left Legalism's editors depict left law and
scholarship as uncritically subservient to liberal law
reforms, like equality in family law, race-based affirmative
action, or sexual harassment doctrine, omitting without
explanation a rich body of contemporary critical race and
feminist scholarship criticizing these law reforms and their
liberal theoretical ground.413 Subsequent chapters continue
this pattern of placing feminism and critical race theory
primarily on the side of liberalism, leaving out the
extensive and influential challenges to faith in liberal rights
from the feminist and critical race scholarship of, for
example, Martha Fineman, Derrick Bell, and Richard
Delgado, as well as critical progressive scholarship on
human rights. 414 It is these undefended exclusions, not just
rigorous reasoning, that helps position the book as an
example of bold intellectual leadership that deserves to take
the reigns of left politics away from anti-subordination
movements.
412. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 25-26.
413. Id. at 13-17, 29.
414. For examples of this omitted but influential critical race and feminist
scholarship challenging "liberal" law reforms, see Richard Delgado, Affirmative
Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 355 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995);
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); Sharon K. Hom, Female Infanticide in
China: The Human Rights Specter and Thoughts Toward (An)other Vision, in
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 250, at 372; MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN
RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE (2002).
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The book does contain exceptions to this overall pattern
of uncritically measuring good theory in significant part as
distance from feminism, anti-racism, and other identity-
based movements. Janet Halley's chapter on sexual
harassment recognizes and affirms Catharine MacKinnon's
early work as a radical critique of gender and sex as the
products of power.415 Drucilla Cornell turns to feminist
activism in India as a source of theoretical leadership on
questions of reproductive rights, discussing Nivedita
Menon's analysis of abortion of female fetuses as an
important contribution. 416  Wendy Brown's concluding
chapter recognizes Gayatri Spivak's critical analysis of the
paradox of liberal rights for feminism and for anti-
subordination movements. 417
2. Which Identity Theories Count as Successful Politics?
This sort of scrutiny of what and who gets engaged as
theory may seem like petty bean-counting. Yet the
seemingly superficial politics of intellectual including and
excluding goes to the heart of the book's substantive
reasoning. If indeed left identity politics in general, and
critical race and feminist jurisprudence in particular, have
already produced abundant anti-essentialist critiques of
liberal legalism, then Left Legalism's hope to recover left
power with more bold theory and less identity politics
seems politically and intellectually naive. If the book had
more fully recognized that critical literature, it might have
pushed its analysis further to ask not why so much of the
left excludes powerful theoretical critique, but why so much
of the left's bold theoretical critiques-particularly those
developing anti-subordination jurisprudence-remain
excluded from power?
That reframed question not only points more critical
attention to the institutional and economic barriers to left
scholarship, as discussed earlier in this article, but also
presents a more complex view of the intellectual and
415. Halley, supra note 48, at 83.
416. Cornell, supra note 201, at 364-68.




political challenge facing left anti-subordination
movements. By shifting the vantage point to the politics of
theory, we can examine left politics as caught within a
double bind of identity. Within a mainstream theoretical
framework that (consciously or not) entwines rationality
and legitimate, effective authority with traditional markers
of race, gender, and class, opposition to identity-based
subordination will tend to appear powerful and relevant to
the extent it is constructed as irrational or untheoretical-
an expression of crude instrumental identity politics.
Conversely, left anti-subordination analysis will often
appear theoretical or rational to the extent it is constructed
as lacking in political force or relevancy-an exotic
indulgence or utopian idealism.
For example, centrist scholars have often challenged
critical race theory on the ground that it is both too anti-
intellectual and too intellectual to command serious
authority among mainstream legal scholars or policy
makers. Critics portray the scholarship of Patricia
Williams, for example, as anti-intellectual on the ground
that it subverts liberalism's faith in abstract, impartial
principle free from racial substance. 418 But the same critics
have blamed Williams and other critical race scholars for
writing that is inaccessible and impractical because it fails
to connect "with the experiences of white and male readers"
or to offer clear policy prescriptions. 419
If Brown and Halley are correct that hard-hitting left
critique has become a silenced victim of powerful
"censorship" by a simplistic multicultural politics focused on
happily accommodating and celebrating identity-based
"difference," then this might reflect the power of right-wing,
not left-leaning, identity politics. Right-wing politics has
been happy to turn law reformers and scholars from
418. For the classic example, see FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 236; Daniel
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 849 (1993) (arguing that the storytelling of
critical race scholars like Patricia Williams, Richard Delgado, and Derrick Bell
rejects reasoned analysis in favor of politics). On the other hand, Duncan
Kennedy characterizes Williams as an example of critical race theory's
excessive liberalism. See also Kennedy, supra note 71, at 180.
419. Farber & Sherry, supra note 418, at 827.
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challenging white supremacy to celebrating (and criticizing)
multicultural diversity. 420 By narrowing anti-subordination
politics to "identity," some of Left Legalism's contributors
join the political right in constructing the debate over race,
gender, and other status hierarchies as contests of culture,
rather than contests of power. 421 That refusal is consistent
with many of the contributors' postmodern skepticism of a
structural vision that identifies clear lines of domination
and subordination.
But perhaps the book's tendency to avoid exploring and
challenging systemic subordination is not simply a product
of bold theory. Instead, perhaps Left Legalism (despite its
contrary intentions) ends up being a more humble
acknowledgement of the realities of politically expedient
compromise-an accommodation, after all, to the wolves at
our door. Left Legalism's effort to shift left politics away
from identity could be most persuasive, from a critical
perspective, as a strategic judgment that opposition to
identity-based subordination makes for unsuccessful
politics, regardless of its theoretical merits. In this view, the
real problem is that the left will not achieve political
success in mobilizing progressive economic interests until it
pays the price of acquiescing in right-wing identity politics
because the working class majority is culturally
conservative. 42
2
B. The Identity Politics of Economic Class
Such arguments which lead back to the debate between
class and culture have long divided left politics and
theory.423 Some contributions to Left Legalism inscribe this
divide deeper, suggesting that left critique requires focusing
420. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
421. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 216-78 (discussing Ford,
Kelman and Lester); Kennedy, supra note 71, at 179-82.
422. Thanks to Jack Schlegel for comments along this line.
423. See DUGGAN, supra note 372, at xv-xix, 6-7 (criticizing this divide).
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on economic "redistribution"424  instead of on legal
regulation of race, sex, gender, and disability.
425
Contributors suggest, for instance, that the left should turn
away from pursuing rights to gay marriage toward
promoting better access to health insurance regardless of
family status;426 from pursuing rights to educational equity
for persons with disabilities to securing better funding for
public education; 427 from promoting sexual harassment
regulations to building stronger labor organizations. 428
Once again, from a more sharply critical perspective,
this choice between economic politics and cultural politics
may be more a right-wing Catch-22 than a route toward
left-wing strength in theory or politics. 429 The more
progressive politics eschews identity politics in favor of
economic issues (like international finance, tax, health
insurance, collective bargaining rules, utility regulation,
campaign finance, or corporate governance), the more it
appears materialistic, technocratic, outdated, weak,
uninspiring, obscure, impractical, inaccessible,
bureaucratic, controlling, immoral, and dangerous
compared to the right. But the more progressive politics
engages identity politics at the expense of economic politics
(defending racial affirmative action, abortion rights, gay
and lesbian rights, protecting against sexual harassment,
racial profiling, or disability discrimination), the more it
appears elitist, frivolous, obscure, outdated, controlling,
immoral, irrelevant, or dangerous compared to the right.
424. For a critique of the idea of "redistribution" (as opposed to some
normalized and naturalized distribution), see McCluskey, supra note 318, at
1307-08.
425. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 3 (questioning "the displacement
of distributive concerns by equality"); Kelman & Lester, supra note 215, at 160-
64; Kennedy, supra note 71, at 181. For a critique of the opposition between
questions of economic distribution and questions of race and gender equality,
see McCluskey, supra note 41.
426. See Butler, supra note 48, at 236.
427. See Kelman & Lester, supra note 215, at 152-64.
428. See Halley, supra note 48, at 81 (advocating a return to "socialist
feminism" in place of "cultural feminism").
429. See McCluskey, supra note 318 (arguing that the opposition between
cultural issues and economic issues serves to undermine progressive politics).
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Why do not more indebted, overworked, Americans
struggling to pay for acceptable housing, education, and
health care show more political interest in economic policies
that would seem to better support their material needs?
Why do some Americans seem willing to sacrifice access to
health insurance or retirement security they would use and
enjoy for a ban on the gay marriage they were not planning
to have? That puzzle can be better answered by examining
how right-wing political movements have helped create a
culture identifying egalitarian economic policies with
femininity, childishness, sexual deviance, foreignness,
physical weakness, racial inferiority, and with secularism.
The problem, as Lisa Duggan argues in her call for
deeper left critiques of neoliberalism, 430 is that the right's
theory and politics of economic inequality is a cultural and
moral politics, despite its technocratic and libertarian
veneer.431 "Neoliberalism was constructed in and through
cultural and identity politics and cannot be undone . . .
without constituencies and analyses that respond directly
to that fact."432 Neoliberalism-or free-market economic
ideology-"organizes material and political life in terms of
race, gender, and sexuality as well as economic class and
nationality, or ethnicity and religion."433
The upwardly redistributive policies characteristic of
recent U.S.-led global economic policy are the products of a
well-funded, well-organized (though often conflicted and not
fully conscious) cultural and political movement to build
support for elite business and financial interests. 434 From
presidential candidate Barry Goldwater to Presidents
Nixon, Reagan, and Bush (elder and younger), right-wing
strategists have worked hard to direct many Americans'
increased economic and cultural anxiety away from the
enormous gains being reaped by the wealthiest corporate
managers and owners-and away from the racial and other
forms of identity-based oppression that often fueled those
430. DUGGAN, supra note 372, at 71.
431. See id. at 3.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. See id. at xvii, 12; see also text accompanying supra note 102.
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gains-toward the more modest egalitarian gains achieved
by women, nonwhites, and others identified in "cultural"
terms.43 5 In the last quarter of the twentieth century,
conservative leaders from libertarian and authoritarian
camps have together (though not always in concert) built
winning political coalitions by convincing enough white
male voters (and their dependents) that they should be
more afraid of the potential power of black or brown or
yellow people (or of feminists or gay rights advocates or
non-Christians) than of the legal, economic, and (indirect)
military power of their bosses and bankers. 436 It is this
strategy of linking economic inequality to many Americans'
perceptions of cultural security that helps explain why,
during this era, enough non-wealthy white American voters
lend support to political agenda that advocates spending
more money incarcerating people of color than securing
most Americans' access to high-quality public education;
more money supporting foreign militarism than protecting
most Americans from the risk of losing their health
insurance, child care, jobs, or retirement income; and more
energy opposing race-based affirmative action, gay
marriage, or immigration than challenging the
435. See, e.g., DAN T. CARTER, FROM GEORGE WALLACE TO NEWT GINGRICH:
RACE IN THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION 1963-1994, xiv (1996)
(concluding that "even though the streams of racial and economic conservatism
have sometimes flowed in separate channels, they ultimately joined in the
political coalition that reshaped American politics from the 1970s through the
mid-1990s"); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE
IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1992) (explaining
the decline of the Democratic party to the Republican party's success in
mobilizing white racial anxiety against liberal or progressive tax policies);
GODFREY HODGSON, MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: AMERICA FROM NIXON TO THE
NEW CENTURY (2004) (linking the rise of right-wing economic policies and class
inequality in part to racial politics); LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: THE
ORIGINS OF THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT (2001) (studying the rise of social
conservatism in 1960s Orange County, California).
436. See KEVIN M. KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN CONSERVATISM (2005) (tracing the rise of suburban-based right-wing
economic politics in Atlanta to the withdrawal of middle class whites from
support for racial equality); Carl H. Nightingale, "Recognize It Without
Appearing To": Defending a World of White Privilege (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Buffalo Law Review) (tracing the rise of neoliberalism in the




International Monetary Fund, corporate welfare and fraud,
or tax cuts for the rich.
Right-wing activists and intellectuals have constructed
American class politics as identity politics. In U.S. politics,
the term "nanny state" codes progressive economics as an
affront to a moral order dependent on upper-class (probably
white) male authority over women, children, and servants
(especially servants of color). 43 7 Similarly, the "girly-man"
slur (popularized in the 2004 Presidential campaign) has
become a shorthand argument defending inegalitarian
economic policies.438 Such terms convey the message that
defending the privileged status of white Christian
masculinity, American nationalism, and the heterosexual,
patriarchal family requires not only attacking, for instance,
racial affirmative action, abortion, or gay marriage-but
also requires promoting tax cuts for the very wealthiest,
cutting welfare benefits for the very poorest, reducing
plaintiffs' tort rights, privatizing public services, and
deregulating business.
439
Furthermore, right-wing cultural and political
movements often attempt to essentialize this racialization,
nationalization, masculinization, (hetero)sexualization, and
Christianization of neoliberal right-wing economics as a
mysterious or inevitable part of working-class American
human nature. Justice Scalia, for example, couches his
decisions opposing gay rights or abortion as deference to a
non-elite culture who hold their anti-feminist or anti-gay
moral views normally, naturally, and trans-historically free
437. See, e.g., SIMON, ACTION, supra note 89, at 22 (Olin Foundation leader
outlining his political and philanthropic project of challenging 'big mother'
down in Washington" who treats Americans like "self-indulgent infants who
need a federal nanny to look after us at every waking moment"); McCluskey,
supra note 45, at 150 (citing and criticizing use of the "nanny state" slur);
Myriam Marquez, Editorial, Florida Democrats Stuck with Kerry, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Mar. 4, 2004 at A21 (criticizing Presidential candidate John Kerry
for advancing "nanny state" policies).
438. See, e.g., Andrea Peyser, This Party's Dem and Dumber, N.Y. POST, Apr.
20, 2005, at 10 (using this slur to condemn a Democratic politician's opposition
to increased tax cuts for the wealthy).
439. See McCluskey, supra note 41, at 808-22, 828-32 (identifying
connections between right-wing identity politics and right-wing libertarian
economics in welfare and workers compensation reform).
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from indoctrination by well-funded or self-interested
professionals. 440 In contrast, Scalia constructs contrary pro-
gay or pro-choice moral views as distinctly cultivated and
cultured-the product of the socialization into upper class
institutions like law schools and country clubs. 441 By
constructing right-wing morality as the true marker of non-
wealthy economic status, advocates of right-wing economics
can deny and excuse their own dependence on and
promotion of race, gender, sexual (and other) status-based
subordination. In fact, empirical studies of voting patterns
refute simple assumptions that working class white
Americans have been a major source of moral conservatives'
increased political power. 442  By stereotyping and
essentializing the working class as the source of
conservative cultural politics, the right, rather than the left,
can appear to be the true defender of working class
interests.
Neoliberal "free market" ideology-like liberalism more
generally-gains political and theoretical power among
centrist and liberal elites by obscuring the connections
between economic politics and identity politics. If policies
promoting free trade, deregulation, privatized public
schools, or tort reform can be portrayed as above and
beyond the cultural fray, grounded in neutral economics,
then the harmful disparate impact of these policies along
440. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601-05 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court's decision to strike down a Texas sodomy
law represented a departure from the Court's obligation to defer to tradition
and respect for the democratic process); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652-53
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for deference to democratic traditional
mores); see also McCluskey, supra note 318, at 1292 (discussing the class
politics in this reasoning).
441. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing how
the "law-profession culture" has indoctrinated courts with a "homosexual
agenda"); Romer, 517 U.S. at 652-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
"lawyer class" for protecting its right to hand out jobs on the basis of country
club membership without allowing others to protect their heterosexual
privileges); see also McCluskey, supra note 318, at 1292 (discussing this
reasoning).
442. Larry M. Bartels, What's the Matter with What's the Matter with
Kansas?, 2006 Q. J. OF POL. Sci. 201-26 (using empirical data to challenge
Thomas Frank's thesis that cultural issues have moved the working class to
vote their values rather than their economic interests).
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identity-based lines can be dismissed as tragic, but
necessary side effects or essentialized as indications of
separate cultural factors that further reinforce the
superiority of those who prioritize economic principle over
identity politics.
Throughout history, many left critics and activists have
recognized and built coalitions against the problem that the
right often works to divide and conquer economic resistance
by constructing and fueling "cultural" divisions among the
working class (and vice versa).443 More recently, some of
what are arguably the most successful examples of left
political muscle have come from those who have integrated
identity politics and class politics. Some strands of the anti-
corporate globalization movement work to reconstruct
widespread economic security as a political contingency
that may be changed by organizing across boundaries of
race, class, gender, religion, sexuality, and nationality. 444
Similarly, beleaguered labor activists in the United States
arguably have been most successful when they have linked
class politics to identity politics. 445
What can left critique contribute to the spirit and
strategy of both left and right efforts to use identity politics
to bridge rather than divide competing interests? Anti-
identitarian theory and politics can help resist the
neoliberal view (sometimes promoted by left activists) that
conflicts among cultures and interests are essential, fixed,
non-contradictory, and pre-political. Yet an identity politics
443. For a classic history of left resistance to right-wing efforts to divide and
conquer subordinated classes in the United States, see HOWARD ZINN, A
PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492 TO THE PRESENT (2005); see also
DUGGAN, supra note 372, at 87-88 (discussing, for example, the New York City-
based Audre Lorde project, which organizes "queers of color" to address
economic and health policy).
444. The World Social Forum, for example, organizes opposition to economic
neoliberalism specifically by promoting social equality, "cultural" diversity, and
opposing multiple grounds of subordination, and by linking people across
boundaries of race, ethnicity, nationality, geography, and gender. See WORLD
SOCIAL FORUM, WORLD SOCIAL FORUM CHARTER OF PRINCIPLES (Aug. 8, 2002),
http://www.forumsocialmundial.or.br.
445. See, e.g., William P. Jones, Working-Class Hero, THE NATION, Jan. 11,
2006, at 23 (discussing New York City transit workers' strike as an example of
the power of activism linking racial justice and economic rights).
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directed at political economy can also help challenge the
right-wing neoliberal rhetoric (sometimes promoted by left
theory) that engaging in left cultural politics means
capitulating to irrational, illegitimate, unsophisticated, or
uniquely coercive power.
CONCLUSION
This article argues that the theory and politics of Left
Legalism deepens rather than deconstructs liberalism's
divides between theory and politics, between law and
politics, and between left cultural politics and legitimate
politics. These conceptual oppositions are not just
theoretical puzzles, but also help support the material
barriers that make strong left theory and politics an
anomaly or even an impossibility in most of contemporary
U.S. law. The book's effort to re-think left legalism "as if the
wolves were not there" fails left theory and politics by
accepting as natural, normal, and neutral some of the walls
the "wolves" have built to keep good legal theory separate
from strong left politics.
But we should measure Left Legalism-and left critique
of law in general-not simply by asking whether it has
impeccable theoretical or strategic logic. Instead, following
the lead of the book's editors 446 as well as the words of
critical legal historian Robert Gordon, we should conclude
by asking whether "it help[s] give us reason for hope and a
motive for action [in place of] paralysis and despair. 447 Left
Legalism is a powerful step toward upsetting the right-wing
resurgence in law in part because of its declaration of
passion and commitment toward left theory.
Even though imperfectly realized, this passion and
commitment reminds us that U.S. law can set its sights
beyond the limited options, tough choices, and low
expectations offered by liberal legalism-and by the right-
wing economic and moral authoritarianism that would
446. See Brown & Halley, supra note 3, at 32-33 (arguing for the hedonic
value of left theory).
447. Gordon, supra note 81, at 658 (discussing the contributions of critical
legal theories).
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replace liberalism as the answer to a world of increasing
danger, scarcity, and conflict for most people. Left
Legalism's aspiration to bold theory can help remind us
that those "wolves" at the door, however powerful, feed on
ideas, and on the willingness of legal scholars and activists
to accept and promote the ideas that insist that inevitable
barriers preclude a better world. By calling on activists and
scholars concerned about a rightward-leaning world to
imagine the possibility and power of desiring more and
better, Left Legalism breathes much-needed fresh air into
the shuttered halls of legal theory.

